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I. INTRODUCTION 
One of the key innovations of the 1970s regulatory environmental 
revolution was the provision for citizen enforcement of regulatory 
standards. This innovation upset the previous bipolar regulatory model, 
which was a two-way negotiation between the regulated industries and 
the often captive regulatory agencies. By removing agency enforcement 
discretion as a means of underenforcing statutory norms, the citizen suit 
brought a new constituency to the regulatory bargaining table. The 
citizen suit had the intended effect of implementing a regime of full 
enforcement of the new environmental norms. 
But the revolutionary effect of the newly-minted citizen suit was not 
limited to full enforcement of environmental norms. By allowing 
environmental interests to bypass the agency regulatory process and 
proceed directly to court to enforce statutory standards, the citizen suit 
allowed citizens to play a primary role in the development of 
environmental jurisprudence. The citizen suit bypasses the administrative 
rule-making process and resulting judicial deference to agency 
interpretations. In a radical shift from the classic administrative law 
model, where the responsible agency answered questions of first 
impression and judicial review of its answers was highly deferential, the 
citizen suit provided nongovernmental organizations the opportunity to 
develop their own interpretations of the environmental norms and test 
these interpretations in enforcement actions in the courts as a matter of 
first impression. Citizen enforcers thereby necessarily took on the role of 
citizen regulators as well, developing interpretations of statutory 
standards and enforcing these citizen-generated interpretations directly 
against violators in front of judges untainted by regulatory 
accommodations negotiated in a prior rule-making process. 
This Article will examine the role of citizen enforcement litigation 
in the development of the Clean Water Act (“CWA”) jurisprudence and 
in the implementation of the CWA regulatory scheme. This Article will 
focus on four examples where citizen enforcement litigation under the 
CWA had the effect of initiating the regulatory process, drawing 
responses from both the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) and 
Congress. These case studies will include enforcement litigation brought 
to apply underenforced CWA regulation of sport shooting ranges, land 
application of Confined Animal Feed Operations (“CAFO”) wastes, 
pesticide application, and water transfers. 
Part II of this Article explores the origins and experience of the 
CWA citizen suit provision, with a particular focus on the factors which 
made the CWA citizen suit a more successful enforcement vehicle than 
its siblings under other environmental statutes such as the Clean Air Act. 
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Part III of this Article describes the fundamental change in the structure 
of the regulatory state effected by the availability of the citizen 
enforcement remedy under the citizen suit. Part III further discusses the 
change effected through the citizen suit’s elimination of an agency’s 
option of interpreting a statute through nonenforcement and the ultimate 
disruption of the bilateral agency-industry dynamic. Part IV of this 
Article examines the four case studies where citizen enforcement in the 
face of agency nonenforcement had the effect of driving the regulatory 
agenda. Part V of this Article seeks to assess the impact these four citizen 
initiatives had on the overall development of CWA law, and the 
pluralistic regulatory dynamic between EPA, regulated industries, 
Congress, and environmental interests. 
II. BACKGROUND AND EXPERIENCE OF THE CLEAN 
WATER ACT CITIZEN SUIT: NOT FIRST, BUT 
FOREMOST 
A. Origins of the Environmental Citizen Suit 
The CWA citizen suit was not the first environmental citizen suit to 
be enacted by Congress. That honor goes to the Clean Air Act, which 
implemented the first environmental citizen suit provision in 1970.
1
 The 
Clean Air Act citizen suit was itself an innovation. Private remedies for 
statutory violations had long been a staple of federal legislation, from the 
nineteenth-century Clayton Act
2
 and Section 1983 of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1871
3
 right up through more recent consumer protection statutes.
4
 
However, the new environmental citizen suit was the first statutory 
remedy that empowered so-called “private attorneys general”5 to litigate 
personal interests in environmental values that went beyond traditional 
common law interests in damages remedies and protection of person and 
 
1. Clean Air Act § 304, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2012); Pub. L. 91-604 § 12(a) (1970). 
2. Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26 (2012); Pub. L. 63-212 §§ 4, 16 
(1914).  
3. Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).  
4. Consumer Product Safety Act § 24, 15 U.S.C. § 2073 (2012). 
5. The term “private attorneys general” was first used by Judge Jerome Frank to 
refer to private litigants seeking to enforce the public interest by compelling government 
agencies to comply with congressional directives. Associated Indus. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 
694 (2d Cir. 1943). 
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property.
6
 The Clean Air Act citizen suit was an outgrowth of the 
successful initiative by Professor Joseph Sax, then at the University of 
Michigan Law School, to incorporate a citizen’s right to litigate to 
protect environmental and public trust resources into the Michigan 
Environmental Protection Act of 1969.
7
 The Senate then incorporated 
this citizen enforcement idea into its version of the 1970 Clean Air Act.
8
 
Although the initial Senate version of the citizen suit would have allowed 
citizens to sue EPA to compel the agency to bring enforcement 
proceedings against violators, the final 1970 Clean Air Act that emerged 
from the Conference Committee provided for a direct citizen suit against 
violators to compel compliance, and it allowed a suit against the agency 
only in the case of its failure to perform a nondiscretionary duty.
9
 
Proponents of the citizen enforcement suit initially pointed to lax 
environmental enforcement by government agencies to justify inclusion 
of a citizen suit in the landmark air legislation,
10
 but later shifted their 
rationale to point to the efficiencies of supplementing limited 
government enforcement resources.
11
 The federal environmental citizen 
suit thus had its origins in a desire for full enforcement of environmental 
standards, untempered by prior traditions of agency prosecutorial 
discretion or allocation of resources. 
The Clean Air Act accordingly provided for an enforcement action 
directly against the violator of any emissions standard or limitation 
(broadly defined) by “any person.”12 The availability of the citizen 
remedy was conditioned only on the provision of prior notice to the 
violator and enforcement agencies, and the failure of government 
agencies to enforce.
13
 
 
6. See generally Louis Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-
Hohfeldian or Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1033 (1968). 
7. For a history of the origins of the environmental citizen suit in the Michigan 
Environmental Protection Act, see generally MICHAEL D. AXLINE, ENVIRONMENTAL 
CITIZEN SUITS Ch. 1 (1991); see also JEFFREY G. MILLER, CITIZEN SUITS: PRIVATE 
ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL POLLUTION CONTROL LAWS (1987). 
8. MILLER, supra note 7, at 4 n.6 (citing ENVTL. POLICY DIV., CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1970, at 226 
(1970). 
9. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604 § 304(a), 84 Stat. 1706 
(1970). 
10. S. REP. NO. 91-1196, at 36–39 (1970). 
11. See ENVTL. POLICY DIV., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF 
THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1970, at 277, 280–81, 355–57 (1970), reprinted in 
NRDC v. Train, 510 F.2d 692, 727–30 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
12. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (2012). 
13. Id. § 7604(b). 
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When Congress enacted the Federal Water Pollution Control Act 
Amendments of 1972, it incorporated and slightly modified the Clean 
Air Act version of the citizen suit. The CWA Citizen suit provides: 
(a) Authorization; jurisdiction 
Except as provided in [S]ubsection (b) of this section and [S]ection 
1319 (g)(6) of this title, any citizen may commence a civil action on 
his own behalf— 
(1) against any person (including (i) the United States, and (ii) any 
other governmental instrumentality or agency to the extent permitted 
by the eleventh amendment to the Constitution) who is alleged to be 
in violation of (A) an effluent standard or limitation under this 
chapter or (B) an order issued by the Administrator or a State with 
respect to such a standard or limitation, or 
(2) against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure of the 
Administrator to perform any act or duty under this chapter which is 
not discretionary with the Administrator.
14
 
Like the Clean Air Act, the CWA citizen suit provision originally 
authorized direct citizen enforcement against violators of a broadly 
defined set of “effluent standard[s] or limitation[s].”15 But, incorporating 
the Supreme Court’s recent recognition of constitutional standing on the 
part of affected individuals to enforce aesthetic, recreational and 
environmental interests in Sierra Club v. Morton,
16
 the CWA limited its 
citizen suit provision to “any citizen,” defined as “a person or persons 
having an interest which is or may be adversely affected.”17 
 
14. 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2012).  
15. Compare id., with 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(1) (authorizing citizen suits against any 
person for an alleged violation of any “emission standard or limitation”). Section 502(11) 
of the Clean Water Act defines an “effluent limitation” to mean “any restriction 
established by a State or the Administrator on quantities, rates, and concentrations of 
chemical, physical, biological, and other constituents which are discharged from point 
sources into navigable waters, the waters of the contiguous zone, or the ocean, including 
schedules of compliance.” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(11). However, for the purposes of the citizen 
suit provision, Section 505(f) defines an enforceable “effluent standard or limitation” 
more broadly to include violations of the prohibition against unpermitted discharges in 
Section 301(a) of the Act, as well as violations of conditions in permits issued under 
Section 402 of the Act, and other violations in addition to violations of restrictions on 
rates and concentrations of pollutants. Id. § 1365(f).   
16. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 738 (1972) (holding that “the interest 
alleged to have been injured may reflect aesthetic, conservational, and recreational as 
well as economic values.”) (internal quotations omitted).  
17. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(g). “[P]erson” is further defined by the Clean Water Act to 
include associations, corporations, and States, among other entities. Id. § 1362(5). 
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The direct-enforcement citizen suit provisions of both the Clean Air 
Act and CWA turned out to be something of a sleeper provision. 
Relatively few citizen enforcement suits
18
 were brought in the early years 
of the Clean Air Act and CWA.
19
 But when citizen enforcement 
litigation did catch on, toward the end of the 1980s, citizen enforcement 
of the CWA far outstripped citizen enforcement of its older Clean Air 
Act sibling, both in terms of sheer number of suits and effectiveness.
20
 
Not only did the CWA citizen suit provision have its intended effect of 
implementing more comprehensive enforcement, but by bypassing the 
traditional model of agency interpretation through enforcement 
discretion, the CWA upset the bilateral model of regulation and 
fundamentally altered the dynamic between executive agencies, 
Congress, regulated entities, and the courts in CWA implementation and 
interpretation. 
B. Factors Favoring Clean Water Act Citizen Suit 
More citizen enforcement cases have been brought under the CWA 
than under any other environmental statute.
21
 This has made the citizen 
suit a unique force both in CWA enforcement and in CWA 
interpretation. There are several reasons for the relative popularity of the 
CWA citizen suit. These factors include the absoluteness of the CWA 
permitting requirement, the relative ease of proving CWA violations, and 
the relative ease of organizing waterbody-based plaintiff organizations. 
 
18. I use “citizen enforcement suits” to mean direct enforcement suits against 
violators, in contradistinction to the “nondiscretionary duty” suits against the EPA also 
authorized. See Id. § 1365(a)(2). 
19. See MILLER, supra note 7, at 12–14. 
20. See James R. May, Now More than Ever: Trends in Environmental Citizen Suits 
at 30, 10 WIDENER L. REV. 1, 7–8, 30–32 (2003); David R. Hodas, Enforcement of 
Environmental Law in A Triangular Federal System: Can Three Not Be A Crowd When 
Enforcement Authority Is Shared by the United States, the States, and Their Citizens? 54 
MD. L. REV. 1552, 1572 (1995).  
21. See Martin A. McCrory, Standing in the Ever-Changing Stream: The Clean 
Water Act, Article III Standing, and Post-Compliance Adjudication, 20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 
73, 75–76 (2001) (“Historically, there have been more citizen suits filed pursuant to the 
CWA than any other environmental statute.”); Jonathan H. Adler, Stand or Deliver: 
Citizen Suits, Standing, and Environmental Protection, 12 DUKE ENVTL. L & POL’Y F. 39 
(2001); Adeeb Fadil, Citizen Suits Against Polluters: Picking Up the Pace, 9 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 23, 66 (1985).   
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1. Clean Water Act’s Zero-Discharge Standard for Permitting 
The CWA famously incorporated a zero-discharge goal into its 
statement of legislative purposes in CWA Section 101: “[I]t is the 
national goal that the discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters be 
eliminated by 1985.” This ambitious and so far unrealized goal was a 
bold statement of Congress’s commitment to addressing the problem of 
water pollution,
22
 and it incorporated the environmental ethic underlying 
the 1972 legislation that “[n]o-one has a right to pollute.”23 As a 
statement of legislative purpose, the Section 101 zero-discharge goal is 
not enforceable in the Section 505 citizen suit, which is limited to 
violations of defined “effluent standards or limitations.”24 
Nevertheless, the CWA does in fact contain a citizen-enforceable 
zero-discharge standard: the standard for the permitting requirement 
under the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”) 
is based on a zero-discharge standard. That is, a point source discharge of 
water pollutants other than a zero discharge requires a permit. Section 
301 of the Act provides that “[e]xcept as in compliance with this section 
and [permitting requirements under] [S]ections . . . 402, and 404 of this 
Act, the discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be unlawful.”25 
Section 505, the CWA citizen suit provision, specifically defines the 
“effluent standards or limitations” enforceable by citizens to include any 
violation of Section 301, so the prohibition against unpermitted 
discharges is unambiguously within the ambit of the citizen enforcement 
 
22. See Bradley C. Bobertz, The Tools of Prevention: Opportunities for Promoting 
Pollution Prevention Under Federal Environmental Legislation, 12 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 3 
(1992) (“Immersed in the complexities of clean water regulation, one can too easily 
forget a simple fact: The Clean Water Act demands nothing short of eliminating the 
discharge of pollutants into the nation’s waters.”); Roger Flynn, New Life for Impaired 
Waters: Realizing the Goal to “Restore” the Nation’s Waters Under the Clean Water 
Act, 10 WYO. L. REV. 35, 38 (2010) (“Although these lofty goals were never achieved, 
the passage of the CWA was a “bold and sweeping legislative initiative” protecting water 
quality across the country.”); Michael P. Healy, Still Dirty After Twenty-Five Years: 
Water Quality Standard Enforcement and the Availability of Citizen Suits, 24 ECOLOGY 
L.Q. 393, 442 (1997) (“These goals reflect the Act’s concern with ensuring healthful 
water quality and articulate an environmental protection purpose . . . [that] is entirely 
consistent with permitting direct citizen suit enforcement.”); Hodas, supra note 20, at 
1555–56 (“Congress . . . recognized that government enforcement alone would not be 
sufficient to insure that the[se] goals were met. It therefore extended its allocation of 
enforcement responsibility directly to the citizens of the United States.”). 
23. S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 42 (1972), reprinted in CONG. RESEARCH SERV., A 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, at 
1426 (1973) [hereinafter 1972 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. 
24. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a), (f) (2006). 
25. Id. § 1311(a). 
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suit.
26
 Section 502 of the Act defines the “discharge of a pollutant” to 
mean “any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point 
source.”27 The phrase “any addition of any pollutant” makes clear that 
the permitting requirement applies to all point source discharges of water 
pollution, no matter how small.
28
 
Thus, the CWA imposes no threshold for the permitting 
requirement. This lack of a permitting threshold stands in marked 
contrast to the Clean Air Act, which generally does not require review or 
permits for air discharges less than 100 tons per year of any given 
pollutant.
29
 It is thus no surprise that the CWA citizen suit has led to 
many more enforcement actions against un-permitted pollution than the 
Clean Air Act. 
 
26. Id. § 1365(f). 
27. Id. § 1362(12)(a). “Navigable waters” subject to the prohibition against 
unpermitted discharges are not limited to waters that are navigable in fact, as “navigable 
waters” is defined to include all “waters of the United States.” Id. at 7. The precise scope 
of waters subject to Clean Water Act jurisdiction continues to be the subject of 
disagreement. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 716–17, 759 (2006). Writing 
in a plurality opinion for a deeply divided Court in Rapanos, Justice Scalia held that 
navigable waters consist only of “relatively permanent bodies of water . . . with a 
continuous surface connection to bodies that are ‘waters of the United States’ in their 
own right,” id. at 733, 742, but Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion that a water body is 
considered navigable for CWA purposes only if it possesses a “significant nexus” to 
waters that “are or were navigable in fact or that could reasonably be so made”, id. at 759 
(Kennedy, J., concurring), has since been most commonly interpreted as the controlling 
test. See N. Cal. River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 496 F.3d 993, 999–1000 (9th Cir. 
2007); United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 464 F.3d 723, 724–25 (7th Cir. 2006); 
United States v. Robison, 505 F.3d 1208, 1221–22 (11th Cir. 2007). The First Circuit has 
held that either the significant nexus test, or Justice Scalia’s “continuous surface 
connection” test can be used to establish federal jurisdiction over a water body for 
purposes of the CWA. See United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56, 64–66 (1st Cir. 2006). 
For further discussion of this issue, see Robin Kundis Craig, Justice Kennedy and 
Ecosystem Services: A Functional Approach to Clean Water Act Jurisdiction After 
Rapanos, 38 ENVTL. L. 635 (2008); Jamie J. Janisch, Scope of Federal Jurisdiction Under 
Section 404 of the Clean Water Act: Rethinking “Navigable Waters” After Rapanos v. 
United States, 11 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 91 (2007); Bradford C. Mank, Implementing 
Rapanos—Will Justice Kennedy’s Significant Nexus Test Provide A Workable Standard 
for Lower Courts, Regulators, and Developers?, 40 IND. L. REV. 291 (2007); Jenny L. 
Routheaux, Western Wetlands in Jeopardy After Rapanos v. United States: 
Congressional Action Needed to Define “Navigable Waters” Under the Clean Water Act, 
8 NEV. L.J. 1045 (2008). 
28. See Rybachek v. EPA, 904 F.2d 1276, 1298 (9th Cir. 1990) (upholding zero-
discharge requirement in CWA regulations for placer mining); Tex. Oil & Gas Ass’n v. 
EPA, 161 F.3d 923, 933 (5th Cir. 1998) (upholding zero-discharge limit for sand in 
produced water and drilling wastes from coastal oil and gas wells).  
29. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7479(1), 7602(j) (2012).  
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2. Ease of Proof of Clean Water Act Violations 
This general ease of proof is another factor which makes the CWA 
citizen suit a much more attractive option than its Clean Air Act sibling. 
It is much easier for a citizens group to identify, and prove, a discharge 
of water pollutants of any amount than it is for a similar group to assess 
whether a given source of air pollutants adds up to 100 tons of a 
particular air pollutant in a year. It is relatively easy to gather proof of a 
water discharge, and laboratory water analyses are readily available and 
relatively inexpensive. Water contamination is often visible to the naked 
eye in the form of turbidity or color variation. Lab tests for water quality 
are readily available throughout the country, as public health departments 
routinely make laboratory facilities available for testing drinking water 
wells. Proving that a source of air pollution discharges more than 100 
tons of a particular pollutant per year requires expensive expert analysis 
and modeling to determine the constituents and concentrations of the air 
emissions, their rate of discharge, and rates of facility operation. 
Another factor making water pollution cases easier to prove than air 
cases is the fact that, since navigable streams are public trust resources,
30
 
access to water discharge pipes can often be accomplished without 
trespassing on private property. This is a huge advantage for water 
monitoring as compared to air monitoring. A concerned member of the 
public can often walk (or paddle) up to a water pollution discharge to fill 
a jar with a sample. Similar citizen monitoring of a smokestack at a 
power plant or industrial facility is simply impossible. 
3. NPDES Permit Monitoring and Reporting Requirements 
In addition to the ease of proving that an un-permitted outfall 
contains “any pollutant” in any amount, compliance by water dischargers 
with permits is similarly easy for members of the public to assess. 
NPDES permits require self-monitoring and reporting for all but the 
smallest water pollution dischargers.
31
 These “discharge monitoring 
reports,” or DMRs, are filed with both state environmental agencies and 
EPA, making them subject to disclosure under freedom of information 
 
30. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dept. of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 
2592, 2598 (2010); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 551–53 (1981); Shively v. 
Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 16 (1894).  
31. 40 C.F.R. § 122.41(j), (l) (2013). 
2014] Citizen Litigants Citizen Regulators 71 
laws at both state and federal levels.
32
 Some compliance information is 
available on EPA and state agency websites.
33
 
Courts have held that discharge monitoring reports, filed by the 
NPDES permittee, admitting violations are admissible as proof of 
violation of the CWA.
34
 Many citizen enforcement actions require no 
more than an open records request, a visit to the state environmental 
office to review DMR records, and a complaint followed swiftly by a 
summary judgment motion based on the defendant’s own written, signed 
reports.
35
 Until the implementation of Title V permits under the 1990 
Amendments to the Clean Air Act, there was no comparable monitoring 
and reporting requirement for air permittees. Even with the 
implementation of Title V, there has not been a comparable experience 
of monitoring and self-reporting of violations. 
4. Ease of Organizing Waterbody Organizations 
As Justice Douglas eloquently observed in his dissenting opinion in 
Sierra Club v. Morton, 
[t]he river, for example, is the living symbol of all the life it sustains 
or nourishes—fish, aquatic insects, water ouzels, otter, fisher, deer, 
 
32. See, e.g., Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006); N.Y. PUB. 
OFF. LAW §§ 84–90 (McKinney’s 1988 & Supp. 1995). Philip H. Gitlen, Private 
Attorneys General: Let’s Do It Right, 2 ALB. L. ENVTL. OUTLOOK 17 (1995).  
33. See, e.g., EPA, Enforcement & Compliance History Online (ECHO), EPA-
ECHO.GOV, http://www.epa-echo.gov/echo/index.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2013); Ill. 
Envtl. Protection Agency, DMR Search, EPA.ILLINOIS.GOV, http://dataservices.epa.
illinois.gov/dmrdata/dmrsearch.aspx (last visited Sept. 30, 2013). 
34. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 
149, 157 (4th Cir. 2000); Pub. Interest Research Group of N.J., Inc. v. Hercules, Inc., 50 
F.3d 1239, 1252 (3d Cir. 1995); Sierra Club v. Simkins Indus., Inc., 847 F.2d 1109, 1115 
(4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 904 (1989).  
35. See Richard E. Schwartz & David P. Hackett, Citizen Suits Against Private 
Industry Under the Clean Water Act, 17 NAT. RES. LAW. 327, 328, 335–36 (1984) 
(stating that “most of the recent notices of intent to sue have been submitted by 
environmental organizations which reviewed discharge monitoring reports (DMRs) to 
identify noncomplying companies,” and that, “a citizen plaintiff may establish a prima 
facie case for liability based solely on the DMRs prepared by the defendant discharger.”); 
James L. Thompson, Citizen Suits and Civil Penalties Under the Clean Water Act, 85 
MICH. L. REV. 1656, 1658 (1987) (explaining that in a typical citizen suit, “the evidence 
used to prove . . . violations comes from the polluter’s discharge monitoring reports 
(DMRs), which the plaintiff can review in order to determine whether the case is 
winnable before filing suit.”); see also Robert F. Kennedy, Jr. & Steven P. Solow, 
Environmental Litigation As Clinical Education: A Case Study, 8 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 
319, 324 (1994). 
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elk, bear, and all other animals, including man, who are dependent on 
it or who enjoy it for its sight, its sound, or its life. The river as 
plaintiff speaks for the ecological unit of life that is part of it. Those 
people who have a meaningful relation to that body of water—
whether it be a fisherman, a canoeist, a zoologist, or a logger—must 
be able to speak for the values which the river represents and which 
are threatened with destruction.
36
 
Justice Douglas’s key insight, in arguing for broader environmental 
standing than the majority was willing to accept, is that people form 
“meaningful relationships” with water bodies in ways that are uniquely 
different from their relationship with many other environmental 
resources. Anglers, canoeists, swimmers and boaters all form a sort of 
identity with their habitual waterways, giving rise to a sense of 
ownership in the water as well as a sense of outrage to those who would 
defile the water. This sense of connection to particular water bodies 
makes it relatively easy to organize water protection advocacy 
organizations
37
 and to motivate citizens to give time and financial 
support to citizen enforcement efforts to protect a water body. Combined 
with the relative ease of proof of the CWA case and the availability of 
attorney’s fees to prevailing plaintiffs,38 the ease of organizing to protect 
water resources synergizes with low-risk contingency fees for lawyers to 
create an effective, self-funded citizen enforcement mechanism. 
While the Clean Air Act citizen suit also provides for attorney’s 
fees, it enjoys no similar natural organizing principle for advocacy 
groups—people simply do not personally identify with their airshed the 
way they do with their local bay, lake, or river. This factor also helps 
explain why the CWA citizen suit has been invoked so much more 
frequently than the Air Act citizen suit. 
 
36. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 743 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
37. See National Parks Services, National Water Trails System, NPS.GOV, 
http://www.nps.gov/WaterTrails/home/about (last visited Sept. 26, 2012) (discussing 
efforts of the National Park Service to “connect Americans to the nation’s waterways” in 
order to “strengthen the conservation and restoration of these waterways through the 
mutual support and cooperation of federal, state, local, and nonprofit entities”); Marc 
Yaggi, Go Jump in a Lake!, ECOWATCH.ORG (Sept. 30, 2013), http://ecowatch.org/
2012/go-jump-in-a-lake-2/ (“[T]he more we use our waterways, the more we will 
understand, and value, the importance of clean water to our communities. Access to clean 
swimmable waters gives us a day of recreation without fear of harmful pollutants, 
provides a sense of place and inspires us to act as stewards of our waterways.”). 
38. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (2012). 
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5. Relative Ease of Establishing Standing. 
Closely related to the political ease of organizing communities 
around water issues is the relative ease of establishing legal standing to 
sue in connection with water quality. The Article III standing doctrine 
requires that plaintiffs be able to establish injury-in-fact, causation, and 
redressability in order to have standing to bring litigation, including a 
citizen suit. Of these requirements, the requirement of “injury in fact” 
has often proven problematic for environmental plaintiffs, as the 
Supreme Court has rejected injuries found to be too “abstract” even 
while it has recognized injuries to recreational and aesthetic interests. 
Thus, while the Supreme Court long ago recognized in Sierra Club v. 
Morton
39
 that injuries to recreational and aesthetic interests would 
support standing for environmental plaintiffs, the Court has rejected 
claimed aesthetic and professional interests in the well-being of 
endangered species as being insufficiently concrete to establish “injury in 
fact.”40 On the other hand, the Supreme Court has been receptive to 
plaintiffs who allege a tangible injury based on the regular use of a water 
body for recreational purposes. Thus, in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. 
Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc.,
41
 the Court found sufficient 
injury on the part of plaintiffs who alleged that they had fished and 
boated on a river in the past and would do so in the future were the river 
not polluted. The Court reached this holding despite a specific finding by 
the trial court that the defendant’s water pollution had not caused any 
perceptible environmental harm. The relative liberalness of this 
recognition of standing for water plaintiffs contrasts with the difficulty 
citizen plaintiffs have had in establishing standing to protect endangered 
species,
42
 groundwater,
43
 and airsheds,
44
 because their injuries were 
considered too abstract or generalized. 
 
 
39. Sierra Club, 405 U.S. 727. 
40. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
41. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167 
(2000). 
42. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 566–67. 
43. Am. Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 216 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (rejecting 
environmental plaintiffs standing to challenge regulations allowing disposal of tank 
residues in landfills absent proof of actual contamination of groundwater in plaintiffs’ 
vicinity). 
44. See Ogden Projects, Inc. v. New Morgan Landfill Co., 911 F.Supp. 863 (E.D. 
Pa. 1996). 
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III. STRUCTURAL CHANGES EFFECTED BY THE CLEAN 
WATER ACT CITIZEN SUIT 
The CWA was revolutionary legislation in many ways—from its 
idealistic zero-discharge goal to its radical restructuring of federal-state 
authority to regulate water pollution discharges.
45
 The citizen 
participation provisions of the Clean Air Act and CWA also effected a 
fundamental restructuring of the administrative state, upsetting the 
ossified, bipolar regulatory model in which all regulatory decisions were 
made by negotiations between regulators and the regulated industries. 
The CWA citizen participation provisions empowered organized 
environmental interests by giving them a seat at the negotiating table, 
and, even more fundamentally, stripped the regulatory agency of its 
formerly exclusive power to set the agenda for interpretation, 
implementation, and enforcement of statutory regulatory mandates. 
A. Disruption of the Bipolar Model of the Administrative State 
The traditional model of the administrative state, from its inception 
with nineteenth-century railroad rate regulation well through the mid-
twentieth century implementation of the Administrative Procedure Act, 
has been described as a bipolar, or bilateral model.
46
 Under this model, 
there are only two sides considered in the largely discretionary 
implementation of statutory regulatory mandates: that of the agency, 
which was presumed to represent the public interest, and that of the 
regulated entity, which asserts its economic and autonomy interests in 
freedom from regulation. In this model, the function of administrative 
 
45. See William L. Andreen, Delegated Federalism Versus Devolution: Some 
Insights from the History of Water Pollution Control, University of Alabama Public Law 
Research Paper No. 1452794, in PREEMPTION CHOICE: THE THEORY, LAW, AND REALITY 
OF FEDERALISM’S CORE QUESTION (William W. Buzbee ed., 2009); Oliver A. Houck & 
Michael Rolland, Federalism in Wetlands Regulation: A Consideration of Delegation of 
Clean Water Act Section 404 and Related Programs to the States, 54 MD. L. REV. 1242, 
1243 (1995).   
46. Jody Freeman & Daniel A. Farber, Modular Environmental Regulation, 54 
DUKE L.J. 795, 824 (2005) (“The typical resource management agency uses regulatory 
and other administrative tools to allocate resources among client stakeholders and 
competing uses, often doling out valuable benefits while trying simultaneously to 
conserve the underlying resource. Relationships are bilateral between the agency and the 
regulated entity or client stakeholder.”); Mark Seidenfeld, An Apology for Administrative 
Law in the Contracting State, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 215, 220 (2000) (describing the 
traditional model of the administrative state as “bilateral in nature, with the two parties 
entitled to participate being the regulated entity—usually envisioned as a member of 
some industry—and the regulating agency.”) 
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procedures and judicial review of agency action was to protect the due 
process rights of regulated entities against administrative agencies 
compromising their property or liberty interests beyond the congressional 
grant of authority or without appropriate procedures.
47
 Regulatory 
implementation in the bilateral model can be seen as negotiated 
compromise between regulator and regulated. Indeed, contemporary 
commentators noting the resurgence of this bilateral model of regulation 
have analyzed it in contractarian terms.
48
 
By the 1960s, critical commentators noted the problem of “agency 
capture,” in which regulatory agencies become subject to the control of 
the industries that they were meant to regulate.
49
 Agency capture resulted 
from various organic factors, including agency dependence on industry 
cooperation for successful implementation, agency dependence on 
industry for regulatory information gathering, agency avoidance of long-
term adversarial relationships, and “revolving door” employment 
relationships between agency personnel and industry.
50
 By the mid-
1960s, courts and agencies had responded to this problem of agency 
capture by the recognition of expanded standing, first for economic 
competitors,
51
 and later for organized stakeholder groups
52
 representing 
the public interest in the processes of regulatory implementation and 
judicial review.
53
 
 
47. See Richard Stewart, The Transformation of Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. 
REV. 1669, 1717–25 (1975). 
48. See Seidenfeld, supra note 46; Jody Freeman, The Contracting State, 28 FLA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 155 (2000). 
49. See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 47, at 1713–15; Simon Lazarus & Joseph 
Onek, The Regulators and the People, 57 VA. L. REV. 1069 (1971); Arthur E. 
Bonfield, Representation for the Poor in Federal Rulemaking, 67 MICH. L. REV. 511 
(1969); Roger C. Cramton, The Why, Where and How of Broadened Public Participation 
in the Administrative Process, 60 GEO. L.J. 525 (1972); Mary Gardner 
Jones, Observations by Outgoing FTC Member Mary Gardner Jones on the Outlook for 
the FTC, BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP., NO. 636, at D-3 (1973). 
50. See generally Stewart, supra note 47, at 1713–15; Lazarus & Onek, supra note 
49; Bonfield, supra note 49; Cramton, supra note 49. 
51. See Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970). 
52. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739 (1972) (“[A]n organization whose 
members are injured may represent those members in a proceeding for judicial review.”); 
Scenic Hudson Pres. Conference v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 354 F.2d 608, 617 (2d Cir. 
1965) (“Representation of common interests by an organization such as Scenic Hudson 
serves to limit the number of those who might otherwise apply for intervention and serves 
to expedite the administrative process.”).  
53. See generally Stewart, supra note 47, at 1742–47 (“ ‘Public interest’ advocates 
. . . espouse the position of important, widely-shared (and hence ‘public’) interests that 
assertedly have not heretofore received adequate representation in the process of agency 
decision.”); Mark Seidenfeld, Empowering Stakeholders: Limits on Collaboration as the 
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The CWA citizen suit both reflected and amplified the trend away 
from the traditional bilateral model of administration. Reflecting the 
trend toward enhanced public stakeholder power in regulatory 
procedures, the CWA citizen suit (like the Clean Air Act citizen suit) 
specifically empowered any citizen to bring an action to compel EPA to 
perform any duty that is nondiscretionary.
54
 While this “mandatory duty” 
citizen suit reflected the existing trend toward citizen participation in the 
regulatory process and the break from the bilateral model, it was not 
itself a revolutionary advance in public participation because the 
Administrative Procedure Act already gave citizens the right to compel 
agency action unlawfully withheld.
55
 The citizen enforcement suit, on the 
other hand, radically expanded the evolving interruption of the bipolar 
regulatory model because it gave citizens not only the power to seek 
review of agency action and inaction, but also the power to preempt 
agency interpretation by nonenforcement. Judicial review of agencies’ 
interpretation of the law and the deference agencies received for these 
tools of implementation prior to the citizen suit fundamentally changed 
the administrative model. 
B. Disruption of Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretation 
Consider the various interpretive tools available to an agency in the 
absence of a citizen enforcement suit, and the level of judicial deference 
afforded to each. An agency such as EPA has a range of tools to 
implement its interpretation of a statute such as the CWA, ranging from 
direct enforcement through agency interpretative regulations and 
guidance, right up to a policy of nonenforcement against particular 
categories of conduct. Each of these interpretive tools receives a unique 
form of judicial review and judicial deference to the agency 
interpretation. 
1. Interpretation through Direct Judicial Enforcement:  
No Deference 
Perhaps the most straightforward means for an agency to implement 
its interpretation of statutory requirements is to bring a direct 
 
Basis for Flexible Regulation, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 411, 414–16 (2000) (“In order to 
level the field of administrative confrontation, representatives of so-called public interest 
groups, acting on behalf of individuals for whom Congress purported to have enacted 
regulatory statutes, had to be given a similar ability to provide input to agencies in a 
manner that the agency was not free to ignore.”). 
54. 33 U.S.C. §1365(a) (2012). 
55. 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (2012). 
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enforcement action applying its interpretation, without any prior agency 
interpretive procedures such as guidance or regulations. The agency 
simply decides how it wishes to interpret the statute and brings (or refers 
to the Department of Justice) an action to enforce against a violator based 
on that interpretation. An example of this sort of interpretive 
implementation is the United States v. Plaza Health Laboratories, Inc.
56
 
case. In that case, the manager of a blood analysis laboratory was caught 
disposing of unneeded human blood samples and other medical waste by 
loading them in the trunk of his car, driving to the banks of the Hudson 
River, and disposing of the waste blood samples into the River by hand. 
The conduct presented the interpretive question of whether a human 
discarding pollutants by hand could be considered to be a “point source” 
subject to the permit requirements of the CWA.
57
 The government 
brought a criminal enforcement action reflecting EPA’s interpretation of 
the term “point source” to include direct disposal by human beings. 
When EPA or another agency seeks to implement an agency 
interpretation through direct enforcement, its interpretation receives no 
deference from the courts. Indeed, the Supreme Court has declared that 
no judicial deference is due “to agency litigating positions that are 
wholly unsupported by regulations, rulings, or administrative practice.”58 
Far from giving deference to EPA’s interpretation of the term “point 
source” to include human discharges, the Second Circuit in Plaza Health 
applied the criminal law doctrine of the “rule of lenity” to resolve 
ambiguities in the scope of the term “point source” against the 
government and in favor of the criminal defendant. Accordingly, the 
Second Circuit held that contrary to EPA’s interpretation (and at least for 
the purposes of a criminal CWA prosecution), a human being could not 
be a “point source” subject to regulation. 
Thus, direct agency enforcement is one means to implement an 
agency interpretation of a statute such as the CWA, but such 
interpretations are subject to de novo review by the enforcement court 
and receive no deference unless supported by other agency interpretative 
tools such as guidance or regulations. 
 
56. United States v. Plaza Health Labs., Inc., 3 F.3d 643 (2d Cir. 1993). 
57. The Clean Water Act Sections 301 and 402 require a permit for all point source 
discharges of pollutants to waters of the United States. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1342. 
“Point source” is defined as any discrete and confined conveyance, and goes on to list 
examples of specific point sources covered by the permitting requirement. Id. § 1362(12).  
58. Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212 (1988). 
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2. Informal Agency Interpretations and Guidance:  
Some Deference 
Given the ad hoc nature of interpretation through enforcement, as 
well as the lack of deference such interpretations receive, it is no wonder 
that EPA prefers to embody its statutory interpretations in some sort of 
agency policy statement of more generality than an enforcement action. 
EPA may issue guidance documents and counsel opinion letters 
reflecting EPA interpretive positions that fall short of notice-and-
comment rule makings with the force of law.
59
 Although such 
interpretations have at times been given substantial deference by courts,
60
 
the Supreme Court in United States v. Mead
61
 established that only 
agency interpretations that have undergone more formal procedures, such 
as notice and comment rule making or adjudication, are entitled to the 
maximum Chevron deference. Under current law, informal agency 
interpretive guidance is entitled to “Skidmore deference”—a court will 
defer to the agency’s interpretation to the extent that it is persuasive, 
taking into account agency expertise and responsibility for administering 
the statute.
62
 
Despite the relatively weak deference afforded to informal agency 
guidance, EPA may have some incentive to prefer guidance documents 
over notice and comment rule making. This is because agency guidance 
may defer, or even avoid, judicial review on ripeness grounds. Thus, 
EPA guidance documents directing states to implement water quality 
criteria have been held unripe for judicial review.
63
 One court has 
suggested that water quality criteria standards do not become ripe for 
 
59. See, e.g., EPA, DRAFT GUIDANCE ON IDENTIFYING WATERS PROTECTED BY THE 
CLEAN WATER ACT (2011), available at http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/guidance/
wetlands/upload/wous_guidance_4-2011.pdf; Final Water Guidance for the Great Lakes 
System, 60 Fed. Reg. 15,366 (Mar. 23, 1995) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 9, 122–23, 
131–32), available at http://www.epa.gov/fedrgstr/EPA-WATER/1995/March/Day-
23/pr-82DIR/pr-82.html; EPA, AGENCY INTERPRETATION ON APPLICABILITY OF SECTION 
402 OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT TO WATER TRANSFERS (2005), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/npdespub/pubs/water_transfers.pdf. See also Appalachian Power Co. 
v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 1020 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (holding that EPA guidance document 
broadened scope of the underlying rule and was thus improper in absence of formal 
rulemaking procedures).  
60. See, e.g., Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156 (DC Cir. 1982); Nat’l 
Wildlife Fed’n v. Consumers Power Co., 862 F.2d 580 (6th Cir. 1988). 
61. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 218 (2001). 
62. See id. at 218–19 (2001) (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139–40 
(1944)). 
63. See Am. Paper Inst., Inc. v. EPA, 882 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1989); Am. Paper Inst., 
Inc. v. EPA, 726 F. Supp. 1256 (S.D. Ala. 1989). 
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judicial review until incorporated into an enforceable permit.
64
 More 
recently, even in light of suggestions by the Supreme Court to resolve 
ambiguities in the statutory definition of jurisdictional “waters of the 
United States” through rule making,65 EPA and Corps of Engineers have 
thus far preferred to respond through guidance documents rather than 
rule making.
66
 This is so despite the Supreme Court’s rejection of the 
existing regulations defining the scope of jurisdictional “waters of the 
United States” in Rapanos v. United States.67 
3. Agency Rule Making and Adjudication:  
Strong Deference under Chevron 
The next rung up on the ladder of interpretive formality and judicial 
deference consists of notice-and-comment rule making or formal 
adjudication.
68
 Such procedures enlist some level of adversarial public 
review and the considered judgment of the agency, and they are 
accordingly given the highest possible deference in judicial review. 
Under the Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC case, such interpretations are 
subject to review in a two-step process: 
First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to 
the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is 
the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give 
effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. . . . If, 
however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed 
the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its 
own construction on the statute . . . . Rather, if the statute is silent or 
ambiguous with respect to this specific issue, the question for the 
court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible 
interpretation of the statute.
69
 
Under step one of this test, the court determines whether Congress 
has answered the specific question at issue, either through clear statutory 
text or based on traditional tools of statutory construction. If not, the 
 
64. See NRDC v. EPA, 16 F.3d 1395, 1406–07 (4th Cir. 1993). 
65. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 726, 757–58, 782 (2006). 
66. See EPA, DRAFT GUIDANCE ON IDENTIFYING WATERS PROTECTED BY THE CLEAN 
WATER ACT (2011), available at http://www.epa.gov/tp/pdf/wous_guidance_4-2011.pdf.  
67. Rapanos, 547 U.S. 715 (2006). 
68. Although notice and comment rule making is a more formal process than 
internal adoption of agency guidance without public procedures, notice and comment rule 
making is still considered “informal” rule making under the Administrative Procedure 
Act, unless it is accompanied by on-the-record fact-finding hearings. See Annotation, 
Formal and Informal Rulemaking Distinguished, 2 FED. PROC., L. ED. § 2:104 (2013). 
69. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). 
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agency interpretation is upheld so long as the interpretation is 
“permissible.” Chevron step two review is thus highly deferential. The 
question before the court is not whether the court would have arrived at 
the same legal interpretation as the agency; rather, the question is solely 
whether the agency’s interpretation is “permissible,” i.e., is not 
foreclosed by specific legislative language or intent. Given that specific 
congressional intent was eliminated in step one, Chevron step two review 
nearly always results in affirmation of the agency’s legal position.70 
Agency authority to amend statutory norms through interpretive rule 
making is not absolute, however. Even under Chevron review, an agency 
may not adopt a regulation exempting conduct from regulation that falls 
within the plain letter of the statutory command. NRDC v. Costle
71
 
provides an early (pre-Chevron) unsuccessful example of an EPA 
attempt to narrow the scope of the CWA through interpretive rule 
making. EPA, in 1973, adopted regulations purporting to exempt from 
NPDES permitting requirements several categories of point source 
discharges, including silvicultural point sources, small confined animal 
feeding operations, and separate storm sewers.
72
 In rejecting EPA’s 
attempt to narrow the scope of the CWA regulatory program through 
interpretive regulation, the D.C. Circuit noted the unique scope of the 
CWA’s mandates: 
Under EPA’s interpretation the Administrator would have broad 
discretion to exempt large classes of point sources from any and all 
requirements of the FWPCA. This is a result the legislators did not 
intend. Rather they stressed that the FWPCA was a tough law that 
relied on explicit mandates to a degree uncommon in legislation of 
this type.
73
 
Costle establishes the limits on EPA’s ability to amend the CWA 
through regulation. Although Costle was a pre-Chevron case that did not 
apply the two-step Chevron analysis, it limited EPA’s ability to 
countermand express congressional directions about the scope of the 
NPDES permitting program. Subsequent cases have similarly rebuffed 
EPA’s attempts to exempt point sources that were within the literal 
 
70. See Kristine Cordier Karnezis, Annotation, Construction and Application of 
“Chevron Deference” to Administrative Action by United States Supreme Court, 3 
A.L.R. FED. 2d 25 (2005); Charles H. Koch, Jr., Review of Policymaking and Statutory 
Interpretation Within the “Chevron Framework”, 4 ADMIN. L. & PRAC. § 11:30 (3d ed.). 
71. NRDC v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
72. 40 C.F.R. § 125.4 (1975). See 38 Fed. Reg. 18,000, 18,000–04 (July. 5, 1973). 
73. Costle, 568 F.2d at 1375. 
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meaning of the NPDES program from permitting requirements, such as 
pesticide application
74
 and nonsewage vessel discharges.
75
 
4. Agency Nonenforcement:  
Ultimate Deference (Nonreviewable) 
At the opposite extreme from agency interpretation through 
enforcement is the possibility of agency interpretation through 
nonenforcement. Just as a decision to bring a direct enforcement action 
may reflect an agency’s interpretation of the underlying statutory norm to 
prohibit the conduct in question, a decision not to enforce may reflect a 
decision by the agency that the underlying statutory norm does not—or 
should not—prohibit the underlying conduct. 
Unlike interpretation through enforcement, which receives 
nondeferential judicial review, an agency determination not to enforce 
receives the most highly deferential judicial review possible: that is, no 
judicial review at all. In Heckler v. Chaney,
76
 the Supreme Court 
declared that agency enforcement decisions are “committed to agency 
discretion by law” in the words of Section 701(a) of the Administrative 
Procedure Act,
77
 and thus not subject to any form of judicial review. In 
Heckler, the Supreme Court rejected a challenge by death row inmates to 
the Food and Drug Administration’s refusal to enforce drug approval 
requirements against the unapproved use of prescription drugs for 
execution by lethal injection. The Court reasoned that, in light of the 
strong tradition of respecting prosecutorial discretion, agency decisions 
to forgo enforcement should be presumed to be committed to agency 
discretion beyond judicial review, in the absence of clear congressional 
intent to establish binding guidelines for enforcement priorities. The 
Court noted that agencies lack resources to enforce against every 
conceivable violation of statutory requirements and recited several 
factors supporting a strong presumption of nonreviewability of agency 
nonenforcement decisions: 
The reasons for this general unsuitability are many. First, an agency 
decision not to enforce often involves a complicated balancing of a 
number of factors which are peculiarly within its expertise. Thus, the 
agency must not only assess whether a violation has occurred, but 
whether agency resources are best spent on this violation or another, 
whether the agency is likely to succeed if it acts, whether the 
 
74. Nat’l Cotton Council of Am. v. EPA, 553 F.3d 927 (6th Cir. 2009). The issue of 
Clean Water Act regulation of pesticide application is discussed in greater detail infra. 
75. See Nw. Envtl. Advocates v. EPA, 537 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir 2008). 
76. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985). 
77. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (2012). 
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particular enforcement action requested best fits the agency’s overall 
policies, and, indeed, whether the agency has enough resources to 
undertake the action at all. An agency generally cannot act against 
each technical violation of the statute it is charged with enforcing. 
The agency is far better equipped than the courts to deal with the 
many variables involved in the proper ordering of its priorities.
78
 
Significantly, this list of nonjudicially reviewable factors guiding 
agency enforcement discretion includes an agency’s “overall policies.” 
This suggests that enforcement discretion may be used to exempt from 
agency enforcement those violations deemed unimportant by agency 
“policy.” In essence, under the Heckler model of unreviewable 
enforcement discretion, agencies can effectively amend statutory norms 
to permit, on “agency policy” grounds, conduct that a statutory 
regulatory scheme prohibits. Agencies can achieve this effective 
statutory amendment simply by adopting a policy of nonenforcement 
against particular categories of violators. To return to the Costle example 
of unsuccessful regulatory exemptions, the Heckler principle of 
nonreviewability of enforcement priorities would allow EPA to adopt a 
policy of nonenforcement against each of the categories it sought to 
exempt by regulation from NPDES permitting, effectively achieving the 
same result while avoiding judicial review. 
Indeed, several courts have declared that EPA’s enforcement 
decisions are beyond judicial review, just like the FDA’s 
nonenforcement in Heckler, despite language in the CWA Section 309 
providing that the Administrator “shall” commence an enforcement 
action in case of violations.
79
 Nor is the adoption of such a policy of 
nonenforcement as a means of carrying out administration policy 
contrary to statutory command farfetched: in the 1980s, Reagan 
administration EPA Administrator Ann Gorsuch adopted a policy of 
nonenforcement of CERCLA, ultimately leading to congressional 
amendments strengthening the Act.
80
 
 
78. Heckler, 470 U.S. at 831–32. 
79. S. Pines Ass’n v. United States, 912 F.2d 713 (4th Cir. 1990); Hoffman Grp. v. 
EPA, 902 F.2d 567 (7th Cir. 1990); DuBois v. Thomas, 820 F.2d 943 (8th Cir. 1987); 
Sierra Club v. Train, 557 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1977); Caldwell v. Gurley Ref. Co., 533 
F.Supp. 252 (E.D. Ark. 1982), aff’d, 755 F.2d 645 (8th Cir. 1985).  
80. See James Sherman, Altered States: The Article I Commerce Power and the 
Eleventh Amendment in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas, 56 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1413, 1436 
(1991) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 96-1016, pt. 1, at 18, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 
6120 (“Existing law is clearly inadequate to deal with this massive problem”)); H.R. REP. 
NO. 99-253, pt. 1, at 55, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2837. For a 
comprehensive discussion of more recent EPA efforts at deregulation through 
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In the administration of the CWA itself, after EPA’s attempted 
regulatory exemptions for municipal stormwater systems was struck 
down in Costle, the agency adopted an explicit policy of nonenforcement 
of NPDES permitting requirements against municipalities, pending a 
final rule making for stormwater permitting.
81
 This nonenforcement 
policy had the effect, at least as far as agency enforcement was 
concerned, to exempt stormwater discharges from statutory coverage 
under the NPDES program—exactly the result that the Costle decision 
forbade as an exercise of interpretive rule-making authority. And this 
nonenforcement policy is effectively exempt from judicial review under 
Heckler.
82
 Another example of EPA statutory modification through 
nonenforcement is its consent agreement with animal feeding operations 
exempting them from prosecution for violations of the Clean Air Act and 
the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act pending 
development of regulations.
83
 This nonenforcement agreement was held 
to be judicially nonreviewable under Heckler.
84
 
The implementation of the CWA technology-based Best Practicable 
Technology (“BPT”) standards lead to yet another variant of 
nonenforcement. Recognizing the statutory deadline for achievement of 
BPT by July 1, 1977, in the absence of timely effluent limitations 
guidelines on the part of EPA, EPA adopted the so-called Enforcement 
Compliance Schedule Letter (“ECSL”) program. In the ECSL program, 
EPA would issue final NPDES permits for dischargers that contained the 
July 1, 1977 deadline for achievement of BPT, but would at the same 
time issue a side letter binding the agency to refrain from enforcing the 
permit deadline as long as the permittee was in compliance with a 
deferred schedule for achievement of BPT limitations as negotiated 
between EPA and the permittee.
85
 However, as with the enforcement 
deferral assurances for stormwater compliance, these agency 
 
nonenforcement, see Daniel T. Deacon, Deregulation Through Nonenforcement, 85 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 795 (2010).  
81. 49 Fed. Reg. 37,998, 38,012 (Sept. 26, 1984). See generally Joel B. Eisen, 
Toward a Sustainable Urbanism: Lessons from Federal Regulation of Urban Stormwater 
Runoff, 48 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 1 (1995). 
82. See Massachusetts v. EPA., 549 U.S. 497, 527 (2007) (“[I]n Heckler v. Chaney 
we held that an agency’s refusal to initiate enforcement proceedings is not ordinarily 
subject to judicial review.”) (internal citation omitted). 
83. Animal Feeding Operations Consent Agreement and Final Order; Notice, 70 
Fed. Reg. 4958, 4959 (Jan. 31, 2005).   
84. Ass’n of Irritated Residents v. EPA, 494 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
85. See Republic Steel v. Costle, 581 F.2d 1228, n.8 (6th Cir. 1978); Bethlehem 
Steel Corp. v. Train, 544 F.2d 657, 659–60 (3d Cir. 1976). 
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nonenforcement assurances are not binding as against citizen 
enforcement.
86
 
Agency nonenforcement policy would thus be a means of statutory 
interpretation that would be completely exempt from judicial review, 
except for the availability of citizen suits. The citizen suit innovation 
effectively removes this powerful tool for agency modification of 
statutory regulatory programs. Indeed, in recognition that citizen suits are 
beyond the reach of an agency nonenforcement policy, the stormwater 
nonenforcement letters issued in response to the Costle decision 
specifically exempted citizen enforcement.
87
 
Agency interpretive tools run the gamut from affirmative 
enforcement decisions (subject to the most searching judicial review), 
through informal interpretive guidance (given some deference), and 
notice and comment or on-the-record rule making (given highly 
deferential judicial review), to agency nonenforcement policies (subject 
to no judicial review). Given the nonreviewability of agency 
nonenforcement policies, it seems that nonenforcement would ordinarily 
be the most powerful tool for agency modification of statutory norms. 
The addition of independent citizen enforcement changes that calculus 
fundamentally. As Judge J. Skelly Wright observed in another context of 
citizen judicial empowerment, “[the courts’] duty, in short, is to see that 
important legislative purposes, heralded in the halls of Congress, are not 
lost or misdirected in the vast hallways of the federal bureaucracy.”88 
Proponents of strong executive power object to citizen suits for precisely 
this reason, that they remove an unchecked ability of executive agencies 
to undo congressional regulatory programs.
89
 Then-Judge Antonin Scalia 
answered Judge Wright’s observation with his own counterargument for 
limiting citizen standing and enhancing executive authority to 
 
86. See Citizens for a Better Env’t v. Union Oil of Cal., 83 F.3d 1111, 1116 (9th 
Cir. 1996). 
87. See 53 Fed. Reg. 49,416, 49,420 (Dec. 7, 1988). 
88. Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. U. S. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 449 
F.2d 1109, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
89. See Charles S. Abell, Ignoring the Trees for the Forests: How the Citizen Suit 
Provision of the Clean Water Act Violates the Constitution’s Separation of Powers 
Principle, 81 VA. L. REV. 1957, 1966 (1995) (arguing that the CWA’s citizen 
enforcement provision “impermissibly undermines the power of the President in his duty 
to ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.’ “); Harold J. Kent & Ethan G. 
Shenkman, Of Citizens Suits and Citizen Sunstein, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1793, 1798 (1993) 
(asserting that “the structural imperative in Article II for a unitary executive precludes 
Congress from delegating outside the Executive’s control the power to protect the 
interests of the public as a whole in the face of external or internal threats.”); cf. Cass R. 
Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91 
MICH. L. REV. 163 (1992). 
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underenforce statutory norms: “Where no peculiar harm to particular 
individuals or minorities is in question, lots of once-heralded programs 
ought to get lost or misdirected, in vast hallways or elsewhere . . . . The 
ability to lose or misdirect laws can be said to be one of the prime 
engines of social change . . . .”90 
Thus, the citizen suit innovation had the potential to radically 
disrupt executive agencies’ most powerful (and judicially unchecked) 
tool for reducing the scope of congressional regulatory mandates. 
Citizens were given the ability effectively to preempt agency 
nonenforcement policy through a program of citizen enforcement. And 
the relative ease of citizen enforcement in CWA cases made the CWA 
the front line in the new empowerment of citizens to drive the regulatory 
agenda by enforcing underenforced statutory norms. 
IV. FOUR CITIZEN ENFORCEMENT INITIATIVES THAT 
DROVE THE CLEAN WATER ACT AGENDA 
The four enforcement initiatives discussed in this section illustrate 
how the citizen enforcement suit of the CWA fulfilled its promise of 
disrupting the bipolar regulatory model. These citizen enforcement 
initiatives consisted of suits against recreational shooting clubs, 
concentrated animal feeding operation discharges associated with 
manure spreading, pesticide application, and municipal water transfers. 
Each of these enforcement initiatives implicated the scope of the NPDES 
permitting requirement; the precise legal issues involved varied from 
case to case but all involved the interpretation of the four elements of the 
NPDES permitting trigger: (1) a “discharge,” (2) of a “pollutant,” (3) 
from a “point source,” and (4) to “waters of the United States.” They 
share an additional critical feature in common. Each involved 
enforcement against activities or actors, such as agricultural interests and 
gun owners that have active political lobbies which may have been a 
factor in EPA underenforcement of the CWA requirements in these 
particular cases. Furthermore, in each case, citizen enforcement was 
successful in the judicial system which led to an EPA regulatory 
response—either in the form of regulations or guidance incorporating the 
citizen successes or in the form of regulations seeking to exempt the 
regulated activities from continued CWA coverage. This is not to suggest 
that citizen enforcement cases have been the most profound impact of 
citizen involvement in the implementation of the CWA—arguably, more 
 
90. Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the 
Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 897 (1983). 
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traditional litigation initiatives seeking to compel mandated CWA rule 
making had a bigger impact on the overall implementation of the 
CWA.
91
 
A. Recreational Shooting Ranges 
According to a white paper issued by the National Shooting Sports 
Foundation, approximately 7.5 million Americans compete annually in 
trap and skeet shooting activities, at over 7,500 outdoor shooting ranges 
in the United States.
92
 Many trap and skeet shooting facilities are located 
near surface waters and wetlands and are oriented such that both the shot 
and the targets land in “waters of the United States” subject to regulatory 
jurisdiction under the CWA. Traditionally, the shot used was metallic 
lead, which shooters favor for its cheap cost and ballistic properties. 
More recently (and partially in response to the citizens enforcement 
efforts described below), some ranges have adopted steel shot in place of 
lead. Lead, of course, is a toxic metal with well-known neurological 
effects. Although the targets are called “clay pigeons,” they have 
traditionally been manufactured using coal tars, which are high in 
carcinogenic PAHs. 
Sport shooting facilities that discharge into jurisdictional waters fall 
within the literal prohibition of the CWA; shot and targets are 
“discharged” in that they are “added” to the receiving water, the target 
launchers and the shooting pads are “discrete and confined conveyances” 
that fall within the literal definition of “point source,” and targets and 
shot fall within the definition of a “pollutant,” which includes both 
“munitions” and “solid waste.”93 Nevertheless, EPA and state 
 
91. In particular, NRDC’s lawsuits seeking to compel EPA to issue regulations 
establishing effluent limitations for toxic pollutants had a much more profound effect on 
CWA implementation, leading to a statutory amendment and a complete restructuring of 
Clean Water Act regulatory priorities. See Rosemary O’Leary, The Courts and the EPA: 
The Amazing Flannery Decision, 5 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 18 (1990). 
92. Leo P. Dombrowski, Environmental Laws as They Apply to Shooting Ranges, in 
FOURTH NATIONAL SHOOTING RANGE SYMPOSIUM 186 (2008), available at 
http://www.nssf.org/ranges/rangeresources/library/NSRS/08PolicyTrack/EnvLaws.pdf. 
93. As discussed below, the Southern District of New York held in a citizen 
enforcement action that these sport shooting activities did indeed fall within the scope of 
the NPDES permitting program. Long Island Soundkeeper Fund, Inc. v. N.Y. Athletic 
Club, 94 CIV. 0436 (RPP), 1996 WL 131863 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 1996). See generally 
Nicholas J. Johnson, Testing the States’ Rights Second Amendment for Content: A 
Showdown Between Federal Environmental Closure of Firing Ranges and Protective 
State Legislation, 38 IND. L. REV. 689, 693 (2005) (“The discharge of firearms can trigger 
literal violations of three federal environmental statutes: The Clean Water Act, the 
Resource Conservation Recovery Act and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
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enforcement agencies had traditionally refrained from bringing any 
CWA enforcement action against sport shooting ranges.
94
 It is probably 
not coincidental that gun owners belong to one of the most powerful 
political organizations in the United States.
95
 
However, lead toxicity from the accumulation of spent shot 
resulted, in some cases, in serious, visible adverse environmental 
consequences. At the Lordship Point Gun Club operated by Remington 
Arms in Stratford, Connecticut, accumulated lead shot began to show up 
in the gizzards of dead black ducks washing up on the beach. As it turned 
out, the lead shot was precisely the size of the gravel grains that diving 
ducks seek to ingest in order to aid in digesting their food.
96
 One single 
shot was sufficient to deliver a toxic does of lead to these protected 
migratory birds.
97
 The Lordship Point Gun Club was located 
 
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA or “Superfund”).”); David G. Cotter, 
Outdoor Sport Shooting Ranges Under the Environmental Gun—The Final Assault or 
Merely a Manageable Dilemma? 20 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 453 (2003). 
94. See Johnson, supra note 93, at 693 (“EPA has exercised its discretion to set 
enforcement priorities in a fashion that has left ranges relatively unimpaired”); 
Dombrowski, supra note 92 (“Until recently, NPDES permits were not required for 
ranges because regulatory authorities had not considered ranges subject to Clean Water 
Act permitting requirements.”). In the New York Athletic Club litigation itself, the 
shooting range obtained a letter from the New York State Department of Environmental 
Conservation opining, without legal analysis, that recreational shooting activities were 
not covered by the federal Clean Water Act NPDES permitting program or the delegated 
New York SPDES program. Long Island Soundkeeper Fund, Inc., 1996 WL 131863, at 
*14. 
95. See Sari Horwitz & James V. Grimaldi, NRA-led Gun Lobby Wields Powerful 
Influence Over ATF, U.S. Politics, WASH. POST (Dec. 15, 2010), http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/14/AR2010121406045.html (“Over 
nearly four decades, the NRA has wielded remarkable influence over Congress, 
persuading lawmakers to curb ATF’s budget and mission and to call agency officials to 
account at oversight hearings.”); The NRA’s Electoral Influence, WASH. POST (Dec. 15, 
2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/nation/guns/nra-endorsements-
campaign-spending/ (The National Rifle Association spent nearly $7 million dollars 
endorsing candidates in two-thirds of congressional races during the 2010 elections, and 
80% of those endorsed won.); Brian Palmer, Why is the NRA so Powerful? SLATE, (June 
29, 2012), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/2012/06/eric_
holder_charged_with_contempt_how_did_the_nra_swing_the_votes_of_so_many_demo
crats_.html (citing polling data indicating that gun-owner rights advocates tend to be 
single-issue voters, and perception of National Rifle Association members as active and 
effective grassroots campaigners as sources of the organizations influence over 
politicians).   
96. MASS. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., ASSESSMENT OF ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSOCIATED 
WITH LEAD SHOT AT TRAP, SKEET & SPORTING CLAYS RANGES 6–7 (2009), available at 
http://www.mass.gov/dep/toxics/stypes/lsersk.pdf.  
97. See id. at 3. 
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immediately adjacent to critical habitat for black ducks. During its ninety 
years of operations, the Lordship Point facility deposited over 2,400 tons 
of lead onto surrounding lands and into adjacent tidal areas of the Long 
Island Sound, as well as over 11 million pounds of target fragments.
98
 
In 1985, the State of Connecticut responded to citizen concerns by 
commencing an administrative cleanup action pursuant to the 
Connecticut clean water law.
99
 Remington was ordered to study the 
extent of contamination and remediate the contamination. Nevertheless, 
Remington Arms proposed to continue operation of the facility, 
switching from lead shot to steel shot. Now that public attention was 
drawn to the issue, a fledgling environmental organization—the 
Connecticut Coastal Fishermen’s Association—issued a sixty-day notice 
letter under the CWA citizen suit provision to prevent the continued 
discharge of target materials and shot in any form into the Long Island 
Sound. While the notice letter was pending, Remington Arms closed the 
facility and announced that it would not reopen. 
When CCFA sued under both the CWA and the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”)100, Remington raised 
defenses based on a claim that Connecticut DEP’s administrative order 
precluded a citizen suit, that the complaint failed to allege the continuing 
violation of the CWA requisite for a citizen suit, and that the lead shot 
and target materials could not be considered hazardous solid wastes 
subject to regulation under RCRA. The District Court for the District of 
Connecticut dismissed the CWA citizen suit, holding that the 
Connecticut DEP cleanup order constituted diligent administrative 
prosecution under a comparable state law, despite the fact that no penalty 
had been assessed.
101
 On appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
affirmed the dismissal of the CWA citizen suit, but did so exclusively on 
the grounds that there was no good-faith allegation of an ongoing 
violation of the CWA discharge prohibition.
102
 The court noted, 
 
98. Conn. Coastal Fishermen’s Ass’n v. Remington Arms Co., 989 F.2d 1305, 1308 
(2d Cir. 1993). 
99. See Conn. Coastal Fishermen’s Ass’n. v. Remington Arms Co., 777 F. Supp. 
173 (D. Conn. 1991), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 989 F.2d 1305 (2d Cir. 1993). 
100. 42 U.S.C. § 6962 (2012). 
101. See Conn. Coastal Fishermen’s Ass’n., 777 F. Supp. at 173. The district court 
also denied the range’s motion for summary judgment on liability under RCRA, holding 
that the lead shot was hazardous waste subject to regulation under Subtitle D of the 
RCRA. 
102. See Remington Arms Co., 989 F.2d at 1305. The Second Circuit also reversed 
the district court’s holding that the spent shot constituted a hazardous waste regulated 
under Subtitle D of the RCRA, holding that for the purpose of RCRA’s regulatory 
program, the spent shot did not fall within EPA’s regulatory definition of “solid waste.” 
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incidentally, that had the Lordship Point Gun Club continued in 
operation with steel shot, the CWA citizen suit would not have been 
foreclosed, as “[t]he Act’s definition of ‘pollutant’ does not distinguish 
between lead and steel shot; both are pollutants.”103 
While the Remington Arms litigation was not successful as a CWA 
citizen suit, Connecticut Coastal Fishermen’s Association, and its 
successor organization, Long Island Soundkeeper Fund were now alerted 
to the toxic impacts of gun clubs that discharge into water, and their 
unenforced regulatory obligations under the CWA NPDES program. 
Soundkeeper next gave notice of intent to sue another gun club that 
discharged directly into the Long Island Sound, the New York Athletic 
Club facility located at Travis Island in New Rochelle Harbor, New 
York. This facility was located directly across the harbor channel from 
Glen Island, a popular Westchester County park. Shooting was limited to 
the winter months of the year, as otherwise boaters using the harbor 
channel complained of lead shot raining down on them in the channel. 
Unlike the Lordship Point Gun Club, New York Athletic Club 
chose to contest their coverage under the NPDES permitting program 
rather than simply shut down to moot a citizen suit. The shooting range 
argued that it was not a “point source” subject to the CWA prohibition 
against unpermitted discharges, relying on recent Second Circuit 
precedent holding that individual human beings were not within the 
definition of “point source.”104 The range also argued that the lead shot 
and targets were not within the definition of a pollutant as they were not 
“solid wastes” at the time they were discharged, and that the inclusion of 
the term “munitions” in the definition of “pollutants” was meant to be 
limited to military munitions. Despite its history of no enforcement 
against shooting ranges, EPA submitted an amicus curiae brief 
supporting Soundkeeper’s claims that the gun club constituted a “point 
source” “discharge” of “pollutants” subject to regulation under the 
NPDES program. 
 
Id. at 1315–16. At the same time, the circuit court held that the spent shot and targets 
materials could constitute “solid waste” for the purpose of the statutory definition of 
“solid waste,” allowing the citizens’ claim for remediation of an imminent and substantial 
endangerment to human health or the environment to proceed under Section 
7002(a)(1)(B) of the RCRA. Id. at 1316. 
103. Id. at 1313. 
104. United States v. Plaza Health Labs., Inc., 3 F.3d 643 (2d Cir. 1993). In Plaza 
Health, the Second Circuit reversed the criminal Clean Water Act conviction of a 
manager of a blood testing laboratory who had disposed of medical waste—human blood 
vials—by throwing the vials into the Hudson River. The Court held that, at least for a 
criminal prosecution in which the “rule of lenity” applied, the statutory definition of 
“point source” could not be extended to an individual. 
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The District Court for the Southern District of New York rejected 
each of defendant’s arguments and granted summary judgment in favor 
of the plaintiffs on the CWA claims. The court held that even though 
individuals were not considered point source, the entire facility could be 
considered a point source since it concentrated shooting and target 
activities into one location.
105
 The court also held that shot and targets 
fell within the CWA’s broad definition of pollutants, which was broad 
enough to include previously useful substances, and noted the Second 
Circuit’s dicta in Remington that both lead and steel shot are 
“pollutants.” 
Soundkeeper remains the leading case on CWA coverage of gun 
clubs that discharge into jurisdictional waters. It has been followed by 
federal courts in Illinois
106
and Maryland.
107
 No case since Soundkeeper 
has rejected the application of the CWA permitting requirement to gun 
ranges that discharge shot or targets into jurisdictional waters.
108
 As for 
the New York Athletic Club Travis Island facility itself, the facility was 
unable to get a NPDES permit because, regardless of the toxicity of the 
shot, deposition of the targets and target fragments on the bottom of New 
Rochelle Harbor would violate New York State water quality criteria 
providing that settle-able solids shall not create a substantial visible 
contrast to the natural bottom. This particular water quality criterion is 
typical among state water quality criteria. The National Shooting Sports 
Foundation now advises its member shooting ranges that any shooting 
activities that will result in discharges to surface waters or jurisdictional 
wetlands should obtain a NPDES permit, or should reorient their 
shooting activities to avoid such discharges.
109
 
 
105. Long Island Soundkeeper Fund, Inc. v. N.Y. Athletic Club of N.Y.C., 94 CIV. 
0436 (RPP), 1996 WL 131863 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 1996). In holding that the entire 
facility could be considered a point source, the Court relied on a Second Circuit CAFO 
case, Concerned Area Residents For The Env’t v. Southview Farm, 34 F.3d 114, 118 (2d 
Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 1795 (1995), which held that the entire CAFO facility 
could be considered a Clean Water Act “point source,” not just the feeding portions of the 
facility. This case is discussed in more detail, infra, in the discussion of the role of citizen 
suits in developing CWA CAFO law. 
106. Stone v. Napierville Park Dist., 38 F. Supp. 2d 651 (N.D. Ill. 1999). 
107. Potomac Riverkeeper v. Nat’l Capital Skeet & Trap Club, Inc., 388 F.Supp.2d 
582 (D. Md. 2005).  
108. The one reported unsuccessful CWA citizen suit since Soundkeeper failed 
because the plaintiffs failed to establish a discharge into jurisdictional “waters of the 
United States” covered by the NPDES permitting requirement. See Cordiano v. Metacon 
Gun Club, Inc., 575 F.3d 199 (2d Cir. 2009).  
109. See Dombrowski, supra note 92, at 188 (“The CWA makes it unlawful to 
discharge any pollutant into a navigable water without first obtaining a NPDES permit”); 
see also Richard Peddicord, Lead Ammunition and Environmental Protection, NAT’L 
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The effect of the gun club citizen enforcement cases was to bring an 
entire class of activities—recreational shooting ranges—within the 
regulatory scope of the CWA NPDES permitting program where 
previously such activities had effectively been exempted through agency 
nonenforcement. EPA, however, made no nationwide response to this 
change in the NPDES program’s scope. On the other hand, EPA Region 
2 has accommodated this change in the NPDES program by issuing a 
guidance document for CWA regulatory compliance by recreational 
shooting ranges.
110
 While this regional guidance document does not take 
any position about the nationwide applicability of the holding in New 
York Athletic Club, it does suggest measures gun clubs should take to 
comply with NPDES permitting requirements. Despite the favorable 
court rulings establishing CWA permitting coverage for gun clubs, EPA 
has not embarked on a program of enforcement actions itself against any 
shooting ranges, and citizen suits continue to be the primary enforcers of 
the permitting requirement.
111
 
B. CAFO Manure Spreading 
Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations, or “CAFOs,” are feedlots 
where animals destined for slaughterhouses are fed until they reach 
market weight. CAFOs subject to regulation under the CWA do not 
include small-scale family farms; rather, they consist of the largest and 
most intense of the industrial agriculture operations in the United States. 
For example, to be considered a “medium CAFO” under EPA’s 
regulations, a facility must house as many as 9,999 sheep, 54,999 
turkeys, or 124,999 chickens (other than laying hens).
112
 A large CAFO 
can contain over a million animals, such as hogs. 
 
SHOOTING SPORTS FOUND. (1993), http://www.nssf.org/ranges/rangeresources/library/
detail.cfm?filename=facility_mngmnt/environment/lead_ammunition.htm&CAT=Facilit
y%20Management (citing allegations that “target machines, accumulation of spent shot 
and target fragments, earthen backstops and drainage ditches holding lead and/or target 
fragments, shooting stations and individual guns are all point sources of pollutants under 
the CWA and thus require individual permits under the National Pollution Discharges 
Elimination System,” and advising “clubs may want to consider avoiding range 
orientations that result in shotfall in waterways, wetlands or natural areas . . . “).  
110. EPA, BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES FOR LEAD AT OUTDOOR SHOOTING 
RANGES (2012), available at http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/documents/
epa_bmp.pdf.  
111. For an example of a rare EPA enforcement action against a gun club, at the 
instigation of a citizen activist, see Andy Bromage, Long Shot, SEVEN DAYS (July 13, 
2011), available at http://www.7dvt.com/2011montpelier-gun-club-lead-shot-pollution. 
112. 40 C.F.R. § 122.23(b)(6) (2013). 
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The environmental and water impacts of CAFOs arise primarily as a 
function of their generation of animal wastes—urine and feces. 
Nationwide, EPA estimates that confined livestock and poultry generate 
500 million tons of manure annually, more than three times the amount 
of human sanitary waste generated annually in the United States.
113
 A 
large CAFO, with hundreds of thousands to even a million head of 
livestock, creates the fecal equivalent of a major city.
114
 But unlike 
human sewage, which the CWA requires to be subject to secondary 
treatment, CAFO waste has traditionally received no treatment—it is 
simply piped into lagoons where it is left to settle and evaporate. The 
contents of the lagoons are periodically pumped out and sprayed onto 
fields. The spray fields are not generally used to grow crops of any 
economic value.
115
 
Two competing statutory provisions bear on the scope of regulation 
of CAFO discharges under the CWA. On the one hand, Section 502(14) 
specifically includes “concentrated animal feeding operations” within the 
definition of point sources subject to NPDES permitting requirements 
and the Section 301(a) prohibition against unpermitted discharges. On 
the other hand, the CWA was amended in 1987 specifically to exclude 
“agricultural stormwater discharges” from the definition of point sources 
 
113. NPDES Permit Regulation and Effluent Limitation Guidelines and Standards 
for CAFOs, 68 Fed. Reg. 7176, 7180 (Feb. 12, 2003). 
114. See John Ikerd, Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations and the Future of 
Agriculture, MO. CATHOLIC CONFERENCE (Sept. 29, 2007), http://web.missouri.edu/
ikerdj/papers/Jeff%20City%20Catholic%20-%20CAFO%20Agriculture.htm (“The 
‘smallest’ Class 1-A CAFO (7,000 animal units) creates more biological waste than a city 
of 70,000 people.”); see also Elanor Starmer, Environmental and Health Problems in 
Livestock Production: Pollution in the Food System,  THE AGRIBUSINESS 
ACCOUNTABILITY INITIATIVE 1, 2 (2006), http://www.ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/rp/AAI_
Issue_Brief_2_1.pdf (“[H]og CAFOs in North Carolina alone produce nearly 20 million 
tons of waste a year—more than the human residents of New York, Chicago, and Los 
Angeles combined”); see also KATHRYN COCHRAN, ET. AL, DOLLARS AND SENSE: AN 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE HOG WASTE MANAGEMENT TECHNOLOGIES (2000), 
available at http://s3.amazonaws.com/zanran_storage/www.environmentaldefense.net/
ContentPages/2470902728.pdf; Peter S. Goodman, An Unsavory Byproduct: Runoff and 
Pollution, WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 1999, at A1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.
com/wp-srv/local/daily/aug99/chicken1.htm (describing an industrial chicken farm in 
Maryland as producing more fecal waste than a city of four million people).  
115. See generally JoAnn Burkholder et. al, Impacts of Waste from Concentrated 
Animal Feeding Operations on Water Quality, 115 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 308 (2007). 
See also EPA, MANAGING MANURE NUTRIENTS AT CONCENTRATED ANIMAL FEEDING 
OPERATIONS (2004), available at http://tammi.tamu.edu/final-manure-guidance.pdf; 
DOUG GURIAN-SHERMAN, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, CAFOS UNCOVERED: THE 
UNTOLD COSTS OF CONFINED ANIMAL FEEDING OPERATIONS (2008), available at 
http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/food_and_agriculture/cafos-uncovered.pdf. 
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subject to permitting requirements. The statute does not specifically 
address the question of whether runoff from landspreading of manure is a 
CAFO discharge requiring a permit or is exempt as an “agricultural 
stormwater runoff.” 
EPA has a mixed record of regulating CAFOs under the CWA. As 
noted, in the same regulations purporting to exempt municipal storm 
water discharges from the CWA struck down in Costle, the agency also 
sought to exempt small CAFOs from regulation. EPA’s initial CAFO 
regulations specifically subjected only the direct runoff from feedlots and 
liquid discharges from waste lagoons to permitting and effluent 
limitations under the NPDES permitting program. Significantly, the 
regulations exempted facilities that grow crops from the definition of a 
CAFO; to be a CAFO under the regulations, the facility must be one 
where “[c]rops, vegetation forage growth, or post-harvest residues are 
not sustained in the normal growing season over any portion of the lot or 
facility.”116 
The classification of a production facility as a CAFO under the 
regulations also depended on the existence of a conveyance of waste 
runoff directly to waters of the United States; facilities that claimed to 
have no discharge from their waste lagoons could claim exemption from 
the CAFO definition even though they sprayed the contents of those 
lagoons onto adjacent fields subject to runoff into surface waters. In 
addition, facilities could claim to be “no-discharge” facilities even if they 
had periodic discharges from their waste lagoons so long as they fell 
within the twenty-five year, twenty-four hour storm exemption—that is, 
if waste lagoons were designed to avoid discharges in a twenty-five year, 
twenty-four hour rain event, the facility was not considered a CAFO.
117
 
The regulations were silent on the impact of surface water discharges 
from the sprayfields, leading factory farms to claim exemption from 
permitting requirements so long as the lagoons themselves were not 
designed to discharge more-frequently than the twenty-five year, twenty-
four hour storm. This definition of a “CAFO” effectively exempted land 
application discharges from triggering NPDES permitting 
requirements.
118
 Only if a facility had a discharge was it subject to 
 
116. 40 C.F.R. § 122.23(b)(ii) (2013). See 39 Fed. Reg. 5704 (Feb. 14, 1974); 
NPDES CAFOs Regulations, 41 Fed. Reg. 11,458 (Mar. 18, 1976).  
117. See NPDES CAFOs Regulations, 41 Fed. Reg. at 11,460 (proposing 40 C.F.R. 
§124.82(a)(2)(ii)(l), “[N]o animal feeding operation is a concentrated animal feeding 
operation . . . if such animal feeding operation discharges only in the event of a 25 year, 
24 hour storm event.”). 
118. See 39 Fed. Reg. 5704; see also NPDES CAFOs Regulations, 41 Fed. Reg. 
11,458. See also James H. Andreasen, Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations: A 
Program in Transition, 21 NAT’L RESOURCES & ENVT. 45 (2007); Dustan J. Cross & 
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NPDES permitting under EPA regulations. Once subject to the NPDES 
permitting requirement, however, the permit would regulate land 
application of manure through a nutrient management plan that was 
incorporated into the permit. 
Land application of the huge quantities of animal waste generated 
by CAFOs causes severe environmental degradation of adjacent water 
bodies. These wastes were applied to the spray fields at rates far 
exceeding any possible uptake by the “crops” grown on the fields—
generally, Bermuda Grass in the case of industrial hog CAFOs. The vast 
majority of the waste spread onto the fields simply washes off with the 
rain, or even flows through erosion channels and gullies directly from the 
spray application equipment to the nearest surface water body. These 
wastes contain overwhelming levels of nutrients, as well as pathogens, 
salts, and animal medication residues. Eighty-five percent of the nitrogen 
in the liquid manure is discharged to the environment and of the fifteen 
percent taken up by cover crops like Bermuda Grass, ninety percent of 
that is redeposited by grazing cattle.
119
 The effect of this land application 
of wastes is to overwhelm the receiving water bodies, by causing algae 
blooms and eutrophication. Hog waste discharges have also been 
implicated in the outbreak of highly toxic Pfiesteria piscicida bacteria in 
the Southeastern United States.
120
 Thus, the operation of CAFOs in the 
United States resulted in the untreated discharge of nearly all the animal 
wastes produced by these facilities to nearby water bodies in the form of 
stormwater runoff, and the effect of EPA CAFO regulations was to 
ignore these discharges for permit purposes. Most CAFOs routinely 
 
Matthew C. Berger, Regulations Governing Discharges of Pollutants from Concentrated 
Animal Feeding Operations, MINN. STATE BAR ASS’N (March 5, 2009), available at 
http://www.mnbar.org/SECTIONS/agricultural-law/03-05-09%20Cross%20Berger%20
Handouts.pdf. 
119. See Regulation of Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations for the Protection 
of the Environmental and Public Health: Hearing on S. 1323 Before the S. Comm. on 
Agric., Nutrition, & Forestry, 105th Cong. (1998) (testimony of Michelle Nowlin, 
Attorney, Southern Environmental Law Center), available at http://gos.sbc.edu/n/
nowlin.html; see also JOHN F. MONCRIEF ET AL., MINN. ENVTL. QUALITY BOARD, 
GENERIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT ON ANIMAL AGRICULTURE: A SUMMARY 
OF THE LITERATURE RELATED TO MANURE AND CROP NUTRIENTS (1999), available at 
http://www.eqb.state.mn.us/geis/LS_Manure.pdf. 
120. See Don Anderson, Why are Outbreaks of Pfiesteria and Red Tides Suddenly 
Threatening our Oceans?, SCI. AM. (Apr. 20, 1998), http://www.scientificamerican.com/
article.cfm?id=why-are-outbreaks-of-pfie; Aya Ogishi, David Zilberman & Mark 
Metcalfe, Integrated Agribusinesses and Liability for Animal Waste, 6 ENVTL. SCI. & 
POL’Y 181, 183 (2003) (“Eutrophication from animal waste runoff is also linked to the 
outbreak of toxic microorganisms such as Pfiesteria piscicida.”) 
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pumped out their lagoons into their sprayfields, and avoided permitting 
by claiming that there was zero discharge from the lagoons.
121
 
Like gun owners, industrial agriculture constitutes a powerful, well 
organized lobby in the U.S. political system.
122
 It is thus not surprising 
that, as with gun clubs, EPA did not aggressively enforce the CWA 
NPDES permitting program against land application of animal wastes.
123
 
The CAFOs took the position that land application of animal waste was 
exempted from regulation under the NPDES permitting program by 
Section 502(14) of the CWA, which exempts agricultural storm water 
discharges from the definition of “point sources” subject to the 
permitting requirement. States similarly failed to enforce water 
permitting requirements against CAFO operations; indeed, the complete 
failure of the State of Indiana to enforce water permitting requirements 
against CAFOs became the subject of a petition for withdrawal of the 
Indiana delegated NPDES permit program and a subsequent lawsuit 
seeking to compel EPA to withdraw approval of the Indiana NPDES 
permitting program.
124
 
As in the cases of shooting ranges, citizen litigators stepped into the 
regulatory breech where EPA and state regulators feared to tread. 
Despite the omission of land application of waste as a trigger for the 
CAFO permitting program under EPA regulations, citizens in several 
states brought enforcement suits against animal feeding facilities whose 
manure spreading activities caused substantial impacts to surface waters. 
These suits alleged that the facilities were point sources subject to CWA 
permitting requirements even if they did not fall within the letter of the 
regulatory CAFO definition. 
 
121. See Bob Edwards & Adam Driscoll, From Farms to Factories: The 
Environmental Consequences of Swine Industrialization in North Carolina, in TWENTY 
LESSONS IN ENVIRONMENTAL SOCIOLOGY 158–59 (Kenneth A. Gould & Tammy L. Lewis 
eds., 2008) (stating that “the slurry of liquid and solid excreta from conﬁnement buildings 
is transferred to waste lagoons and subsequently sprayed on “sprayﬁelds” and that in 
small systems with a “a low enough hog to land ratio, there is no pollution and you have 
a zero-discharge system.”). 
122. See Sector Profile: Agribusiness, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL., http://www.
opensecrets.org/lobby/background.php?id=A&year=2013 (last visited Nov. 19, 2013) 
(“The agribusiness sector has contributed $480.5 million to federal candidates during the 
past two decades.”); Industry Influence: Agriculture, NAT’L INST. ON MONEY IN STATE 
POL., http://www.followthemoney.org/database/IndustryTotals.phtml?f=0&s=0&g%5B%
5D=1 (last visited Jan. 25, 2013) (detailing hundreds of millions of dollars in political 
contributions from the agriculture industry to influence state-level elections and 
initiatives between 2000 and 2012). 
123. See Terence J. Centner, Enforcing Environmental Regulations: Concentrated 
Animal Feeding Operations, 69 MO. L. REV. 697, 710–11 (2004).  
124. See Save the Valley v. EPA, 223 F. Supp. 2d 997, 1013 (S.D. Ind. 2002). 
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In the leading case,
125
 Concerned Area Residents for the 
Environment v. Southview Farms (“CARE”), a community group and 
neighboring landowners sued a dairy farm in upstate New York that 
contained both an animal feeding operation and neighboring fields where 
unspecified crops were grown. As is typical with animal feeding 
operations, the dairy collected liquid manure in lagoons and spread the 
liquid manure on adjacent fields. Testimony at trial established that so 
much liquid manure was spread on the fields that it collected in pools 
and ran off through ditches, pipes, and swales off the dairy property and 
eventually into the East Genesee River. The landowners brought the suit 
as a citizen enforcement action under the CWA, and they also alleged 
common law trespass. Although the district court denied the defendants’ 
motion to dismiss, it granted the dairy’s motion for judgment as a matter 
of law after a jury found five instances of unpermitted discharges from 
the sprayfields.
126
 The district court relied on the exemption for 
agricultural stormwater discharges and EPA regulations’ failure to spell 
out whether sprayfields were part of the CAFO or not. The court noted 
that “neither the Act itself, the regulations promulgated by EPA, the 
legislative history, nor the case law provides much guidance as to the 
meaning of ‘agricultural stormwater discharge.’ ” The district court 
threw out all the claimed CWA violations, holding that the spreading of 
liquid manure fell under the agricultural stormwater exception, and it 
held that the one clear instance of manure spreading for disposal 
purposes was not from a CAFO because the CAFO, by definition, did not 
include areas where crops were grown. The court specifically cited the 
regulation defining CAFOs to exclude facilities where crops are grown. 
The Second Circuit reversed the judgment for the defendants and 
reinstated the jury verdict.
127
 Interestingly, despite the ambiguous CAFO 
regulations and a history of nonenforcement against spreading of manure 
on land, EPA filed an amicus brief in support of the plaintiffs on appeal. 
In reversing the district court, the Court of Appeals reasoned that the 
facility as a whole fell within the definition of a CAFO, as it contained 
the requisite number of livestock, and the livestock were not pastured. 
The court limited the CAFO exception for crop areas to operations where 
 
125. In an earlier case, Higby v. Starr, 598 F. Supp. 323, 325 (E.D. Ark. 1984), aff’d 
without opinion, 782 F.2d 1048 (8th Cir. 1985), the district court suggested that 
landspreading that caused a discharge to surface waters would be included in the 
definition of a CAFO, but found that the plaintiff had failed to prove any such discharge 
from landspreading had occurred. 
126. Concerned Area Residents for the Env’t v. Southview Farm, 834 F. Supp. 1422 
(W.D.N.Y. 1993). 
127. Concerned Area Residents for the Env’t v. Southview Farms, 34 F.3d 114, 123 
(2d Cir. 1994). 
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crops were grown in the same area as the livestock were fed. According 
to the Second Circuit: 
The district court’s holding misreads the regulations and particularly 
paragraph (ii). A lot or facility is an AFO when it confines and 
maintains animals on a lot which does not contain vegetation in the 
normal growing season. The vegetation criterion applies to the lot or 
facility in which the animals are confined.
128
 
Thus, the Second Circuit, in response to a citizen enforcement suit, 
significantly expanded the scope of animal feeding operations subject to 
NPDES permitting requirements: no longer were facilities that avoided 
direct discharges of manure from lagoons while landspreading exempt, at 
least within the Second Circuit. 
CARE was followed by a mirror image case on the West Coast. 
Another community group, coincidentally abbreviated CARE, sued four 
Washington state dairies for similar land manure application activities. 
As in the New York case, the dairies claimed that the land application 
areas were not included within the definition of a CAFO and were thus 
not point source discharges. The district court granted summary 
judgment to the plaintiffs, noting that 
[d]efendants are incorrect in asserting that only the area where the 
animals are confined and the adjacent areas without vegetation can be 
considered a point source. Congress and the EPA were concerned 
with the amount of animal wastes generated by a CAFO and the 
threat those wastes pose to the waters of the United States. 
Regulation of a CAFO as narrowly defined by Defendants would 
mean that a CAFO could remove the wastes from the denuded land 
where the animals are confined and distribute or apply them 
elsewhere without regard to the potential of those animal wastes to 
discharge into the waters of the United States. This would avoid the 
clear intent of Congress as expressed in the CWA and by EPA in its 
NPDES regulations to insure that the animal wastes produced by 
CAFOs do not pollute the waters of the United States.
129
 
Of course, EPA’s ambiguous regulations and pattern of 
nonenforcement would have resulted in exactly the evasion of 
congressional intent the court feared had it not been for the citizen 
enforcement provision. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the grant of summary 
judgment to plaintiffs, holding that “[d]efining a CAFO to include any 
manure spreading vehicles, as well as manure storing fields, and ditches 
 
128. Id. at 123. 
129. Cmty. Ass’n for Restoration of the Env’t v. Sid Koopman Dairy, 54 F. Supp. 
2d 976, 981 (E.D. Wash. 1999). 
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used to store or transfer the waste serves the purpose of the CWA to 
control the disposal of pollutants in order to restore and maintain the 
waters of the United States.”130 The two CARE cases were followed by 
district court cases in the Fourth Circuit that sustained CWA citizen suits 
based on landspreading activities by CAFOs.
131
 
Citizen enforcement suits thus brought within the ambit of NPDES 
permitting an entire environmentally destructive category of pollution 
discharges—landspreading of feedlot manure—which otherwise would 
have been unregulated. EPA’s regulatory response to this citizen 
initiative was more-formal and more accommodating than its response in 
the gun club cases. When EPA revised its CAFO regulations in 2003, it 
included within the definition of a CAFO “land under the control of a 
CAFO owner or operator, whether it is owned, rented, or leased, to 
which manure, litter, or process wastewater from the production area is 
or may be applied.”132 The 2003 regulations also confirmed that land 
application of manure in excess of agronomic rates triggers the NPDES 
permitting requirement and is not an exempt agricultural stormwater 
discharge: 
(e) Land application discharges from a CAFO are subject to NPDES 
requirements. The discharge of manure, litter or process wastewater 
to waters of the United States from a CAFO as a result of the 
application of that manure, litter or process wastewater by the CAFO 
to land areas under its control is a discharge from that CAFO subject 
to NPDES permit requirements, except where it is an agricultural 
storm water discharge as provided in 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14). For 
purposes of this paragraph, where the manure, litter or process 
wastewater has been applied in accordance with site specific nutrient 
management practices that ensure appropriate agricultural utilization 
of the nutrients in the manure, litter or process wastewater, as 
specified in § 122.42(e)(1)(vi)–(ix), a precipitation-related discharge 
of manure, litter or process wastewater from land areas under the 
control of a CAFO is an agricultural stormwater discharge.
133
 
The preamble to the proposed rule making that resulted in the 2003 
regulations recited the environmental problems caused by the 
unregulated discharge of excess landspread manure, and relied on 
 
130. Cmty. Ass’n for Restoration of the Env’t v. Henry Bosma Dairy, 305 F.3d 943 
(9th Cir. 2002).  
131. Am. Canoe Ass’n v. Murphy Farms, Inc., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21402 
(E.D.N.C. Dec. 22, 1998), aff’d in part, 326 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 2003); Water Keeper 
Alliance, Inc. v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 4:01-CV-27-H(3), 2001 WL 1715730 (E.D.N.C. 
Sept. 20, 2001). 
132. 40 C.F.R. § 122.23(b)(3) (2013). 
133. Id. § 122.23(e). 
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Southview Farms to support its new regulatory scope for covered CAFO 
point sources.
134
 In the preamble to the final rule, EPA specifically 
rejected comments by agricultural industry groups claiming that all 
manure spreading should be considered exempt agricultural stormwater 
runoff and that EPA lacked authority to define landspreading operations 
as point source pollution subject to NPDES permitting as opposed to 
nonpoint source pollution exempt from permitting requirements.
135
 
Citizen enforcement litigation thus led directly to an expansion of the 
scope of the NPDES regulatory program, one ultimately adopted by the 
agency itself, despite its initial reluctance.
136
 
 
134. See NPDES Permit Regulation and Effluent Limitation Guidelines and 
Standards for CAFOs, 66 Fed. Reg. 2960, 3029 (Jan. 12, 2001). 
135. NPDES Permit Regulation and Effluent Limitation Guidelines and Standards 
for CAFOs, 68 Fed. Reg. 7176, 7196 (Feb. 12, 2003). 
136. EPA has subsequently modified two aspects of the 2003 CAFO regulations, in 
both instances in response to judicial decisions striking down parts of the regulations. 
First, in 2008, EPA modified the procedure for regulatory approval of an individual farm 
CNMP, in response to the decision of the Second Circuit in Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. v. 
EPA, 399 F.3d 486 (2d Cir. 2005), holding that the 2003 regulations providing for 
Comprehensive Nutrient Management Planning (“CNMP”) approval without public 
review violated the Clean Water Act’s requirements for public notice and comment on 
individual NPDES permit requirements. Revised NPDES Regulations and Guidelines for 
CAFOs in Response to the Waterkeeper Decision, 73 Fed. Reg 70,418 (Nov. 20, 2008). 
Second, in 2012, EPA removed the provisions in the 2003 regulations that required all 
CAFOs subject to the regulatory definition to apply for a NPDES permit, whether or not 
such CAFOs actually discharged. The 2003 regulations had removed the exemption for 
facilities that were designed to have no discharge except in the twenty-five year, twenty- 
four hour storm, and instead required all CAFOs to seek a NPDES permit unless they 
could prove that they had no potential to discharge. In a 2010 case, Nat’l Pork Producers 
Council v. EPA, 635 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2011), the Fifth Circuit held that EPA could not 
require NPDES permits of facilities that did not actually have a discharge. EPA amended 
the CAFO regulations in 2012 to remove the requirement that all CAFOs apply for a 
NPDES permit. NPDES Regulation for CAFOs: Removal of Vacated Elements in 
Response to 2011 Court Decision, 77 Fed. Reg. 44,494 (July 30, 2012) (codified at 40 
C.F.R. § 122.23(d), (f) (2012)). The net effect of this judicial-regulatory dialectic is to 
leave some of the pre-2003 regulatory ambiguity in place: a CAFO with a NPDES permit 
must have a CNMP, compliance with which shields land application from Clean Water 
Act liability as exempt “agricultural stormwater” discharges. A CAFO that does not 
discharge from its manure lagoons (and is thus exempt from NPDES permitting) may not 
be required to have a CNMP, and may thus not enjoy the agricultural stormwater shield 
for landspreading discharges, so long as citizens or regulators bringing an enforcement 
action can prove the existence of a discharge from the landspreading activities. For an 
example of the difficulties in proving such a discharge, see Assateague Coastkeeper v. 
Alan & Kristin Hudson Farm, 727 F. Supp. 2d 433 (D. Md. 2010). 
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C. Pesticide Application into or over Water 
Pesticides are known as “economic poisons.”137 They are toxic by 
design and by intention—their purpose is to kill undesired living 
organisms. Pesticides in general are regulated by the Federal Insecticide, 
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (“FIFRA”),138 which establishes a 
program of registration with EPA combined with regulation of use and 
application.
139
 Under FIFRA, a pesticide may be approved for a specific 
use so long as the pesticide manufacturer demonstrates, to the 
Administrator’s satisfaction, that, among other requirements, “it will 
perform its intended function without unreasonable adverse effects on 
the environment; and  . . . when used in accordance with widespread and 
commonly recognized practice it will not generally cause unreasonable 
adverse effects on the environment.”140 The definitions section of FIFRA 
specifically directs EPA to take the economic, social, and health benefits 
of pesticide use into account and weigh these benefits in making a 
determination whether projected adverse environmental impacts are 
“unreasonable.”141 In contrast to the CWA approach to NPDES 
permitting, which requires all permits to ensure that discharges will not 
violate water quality standards,
142
 FIFRA specifically contemplates that 
adverse environmental impacts will occur when FIFRA registered 
pesticides are used as directed, or used in accordance with common 
practice. 
Even when used according to registered label instructions, toxic 
pesticides may enter waters in many different ways. Crop pesticide 
residues will contaminate agricultural stormwater runoff, which, as 
 
137. Economic poison, MERRIAM-WEBSTER UNABRIDGED ONLINE DICTIONARY, 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/economic%20poison (last visited Sept. 30, 
2013).  
138. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. §§ 
136–136y (2012). 
139. 72A C.J.S. Products Liability § 123 (2013); William H. Rodgers, Jr., 
Registration—Labeling and Misbranding, 3 ENVTL. L. (West) § 5:12 (2012); Federal 
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 5 WEST’S FED. ADMIN. PRAC. § 5264 (4th 
ed. 2012).  
140. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(5)(C), (D). 
141. Id. § 136(bb). 
142. Section 301(b)(1)(C) of the CWA requires the establishment of “more 
stringent limitation[s]” on permitted levels of pollutants in effluent wherever “necessary 
to meet water quality standards.” 33 U.S.C. §1 311(b)(1)(C) (2012). See also 40 C.F.R. § 
122.4(i) (2012) (prohibiting the issuance of any permits with terms or numerical 
limitations that would cause or contribute to a violation of water quality standards); 40 
C.F.R. § 122.44(d) (effluent limits in permits must not cause, contribute, or have a 
reasonable potential to cause, a violation of water quality standards). 
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noted, is specifically exempted from the NPDES permitting program. 
Aquatic pesticides, including aquatic herbicides, piscicides, and 
larvicides, are specifically formulated and expected to be applied directly 
to water. Mosquito adulticides are designed to be applied directly over 
water in order to kill mosquitos in their breeding territory. Despite the 
near certainty that these adulticides will end up in water, the labels for 
common adulticides such as Malathion acknowledge that when used as 
directed, “[t]his pesticide is toxic to fish, aquatic invertebrates, and 
aquatic life stages of amphibians.”143 Pesticide contaminated runoff from 
agricultural pesticide use has been associated with several fish die-off 
incidents,
144
 as have applications of larvicides into marshes,
145
 and 
adulticides sprayed over waters.
146
 For many years, EPA required aquatic 
pesticide labels specifically to alert the user to the need to obtain a 
NPDES permit before discharging to waters: pesticides could not be 
 
143. See 25% Malathion Wettable Spray Concentrate, S. AGRIC. INSECTICIDES, INC., 
http://www.southernag.com/docs/labels_msds/mal25.pdf (last accessed Nov. 19, 2013).  
144. Md. Wasim Aktar, Dwaipayan Sengupta & Ashim Chowdhury, Impact of 
Pesticides Use in Agriculture: Their Benefits and Hazards, 2 INTERDISC. TOXICOLOGY 1, 
7 (2009) (Slovk.) (The pesticide Chlorpyrifos “has caused fish kills in waterways near 
treated fields or buildings.”); 3 STEVEN J. LARSON ET AL., PESTICIDES IN SURFACE 
WATERS: DISTRIBUTION, TRENDS, AND GOVERNING FACTORS 278 (Robert J. Gillom ed., 
1997) (“[I]t has been estimated that 10 to 15 million fish were killed between 1960 and 
1963 in the Mississippi and Atchafalaya Rivers and associated bayous” as a result of 
exposure to the agricultural insecticide endrin.). 
145. See Jan Ellen Spiegel, Pesticides Found in LI Sound Lobsters for the First 
Time: More Study Planned, CT MIRROR (July 10, 2012), www.ctmirror.org/story/
16864/pesticides-found-li-sound-lobsters-first-time-more-study-planned; John Rather, 
Mosquito Arrives, Its Enemies Divided, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2007), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/17/nyregion/nyregionspecial2/17mainli.html; Debbie 
Tuma, Alarm Over Crab Dieoff: Fishermen Eying Tie to Pesticides, N.Y. DAILY NEWS 
(Sept. 1, 2000), http://www.nydailynews.com/archives/boroughs/alarm-crab-dieoff-
fishermen-eying-tie-pesticides-article-1.893632#ixzz2J81VXK7W. See also Anna N. 
Walker et al., Bioaccumulation and Metabolic Effects of the Endocrine Disruptor 
Methoprene in the Lobster, Homarus americanus, 45 INTEGR. COMP. BIOL. 118 (2005), 
available at http://intl-icb.oxfordjournals.org/content/45/1/118.full; TA Stueckle et al., 
Multiple Stressor Effects of Methoprene, Permethrin, and Salinity on Limb Regeneration 
and Molting in the Mud Fiddler Crab (Uca pugnax), 28 ENVTL. TOXICOLOGY & 
CHEMISTRY 2348 (2009). 
146. Peconic Baykeeper, Inc. v. Suffolk Cnty, 585 F. Supp. 2d 377, 380–81 
(E.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 600 F.3d 180 (2d Cir. 2010) (discussing 
links between pesticide applications in response to West Nile virus outbreak and 
suspicious fish kills in several water bodies in Suffolk County, New York); No-Spray 
Coal., Inc. v. City of New York, No. 00 CIV. 5395 (GBD), 2005 WL 1354041, at *2 
(S.D.N.Y. June 8, 2005) (referencing “evidence of pesticides found in dead fish in Clove 
Lake in Staten Island”); see also Kirk Johnson, Pesticide Effect, Hard to Assess, Stays in 
Shadow Of Disease Fight, N.Y. TIMES (July 26, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/
07/26/nyregion/pesticide-effect-hard-to-assess-stays-in-shadow-of-disease-fight.html. 
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“discharge[d] into lakes, streams, ponds, or public waters unless in 
accordance with an NPDES permit.”147 Agricultural interests are among 
the heaviest users of pesticides. Thus, it is not surprising that, as with 
land application of CAFO wastes, EPA has not sought to enforce the 
CWA NPDES permitting requirement against pesticide application. Yet 
the CWA contains no exemption from the NPDES program for pesticides 
registered under FIFRA, and many pesticide applications into and 
overwater fall neatly into the triggering elements of the NPDES 
permitting requirement. Pesticides are “discharged” or “added” into 
water. The addition takes place from a “discrete conveyance”—usually a 
spray nozzle mounted on a vehicle or aircraft. Vehicles and aircraft have 
both been held to constitute CWA point sources in their own right.
148
 The 
pesticides potentially fall within the definition of “pollutants,” which 
specifically includes “biological material” and “chemical wastes.”149 
Finally, many of these pesticides are applied to waters that are clearly 
jurisdictional “waters of the United States,” including tidal marshes and 
estuaries immediately adjacent to waters that are navigable in fact. 
When over 100,000 juvenile steelhead salmon died in May, 1996 
after the application of the aquatic herbicide Magnacide H (a trade name 
for acrolein) to an irrigation canal that drained into the Bear Creek in 
Oregon, a local conservation group broke the pattern of nonenforcement 
of NPDES permitting requirements against pesticide application. The 
group, Headwaters, Inc., served a notice letter and filed a citizen 
enforcement suit against the Talent Irrigation District (“TID”), alleging 
that TID’s application of the aquatic pesticide without a NPDES permit 
violated Section 301 of the CWA. The defendant irrigation district 
moved for summary judgment, arguing both that pesticides could not be 
considered “pollutants” because they are useful products, and that 
FIFRA-regulated pesticides are implicitly exempted from the statutory 
NPDES permitting requirement. While acknowledging that the 
application of acrolein to the irrigation canal satisfied all of the triggering 
elements of the NPDES permit requirement, the district court 
nevertheless granted summary judgment to the defendants, reasoning that 
pesticide applications were adequately regulated under FIFRA.
150
 
 
147. EPA, POLICY AND CRITERIA NOTICE 2180.1 (1977). 
148. See Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982); Sierra Club v. 
Abston Constr. Co., 620 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1980); Am. Mining Cong. v. U.S. Army Corps 
of Eng’rs, 951 F. Supp. 267, 271 (D.D.C. 1997), aff’d sub nom., Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. 
U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 145 F.3d 1399 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
149. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (2006). 
150. Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent Irrigation Dist., Civil No. 98-6004-AA, 1999 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 21569 (W.D. Or. Feb. 1, 1999). 
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Headwaters, Inc. appealed to the Ninth Circuit, and EPA filed an 
amicus brief in its support of the appeal. The Ninth Circuit reversed the 
district court, holding that FIFRA and the CWA could easily be read to 
give both statutes effect, with FIFRA addressing the general impacts of 
pesticide use and the CWA NPDES permitting program addressing local 
impacts. According to the court, “The NPDES permit requirement under 
the CWA thus provides the local monitoring that FIFRA does not.”151 
The Ninth Circuit also rejected the irrigation district’s argument that 
pesticides, as useful products, could not be considered a “pollutant.” The 
court expressed skepticism that a toxic chemical like a pesticide would 
fall outside the definition of “pollutant,” but held that “the residual 
acrolein left in the water after its application qualifies as a chemical 
waste product and thus as a ‘pollutant’ under the CWA.”152 
Headwaters was followed in the Ninth Circuit by League of 
Wilderness Defenders v. Forsgren,
153
 where the court sustained a 
challenge to aerial spraying of insecticides to control the Douglas Fir 
Tussock Moth over United States Forest Service (“USFS”) Lands, 
including streams and other surface waters. In the Forsgren case, the 
USFS relied on several informal letters issued by EPA indicating that the 
aerial pesticide spraying did not require NPDES permitting. The Ninth 
Circuit, relying on the Headwaters case, rejected these EPA letters as 
unpersuasive, and held that the aerial spraying from aircraft constituted a 
discharge from a point source. The court held that: 
In the present case, the insecticides at issue meet the definition of 
“pollutant” under the Clean Water Act, and Forest Service aircraft 
spray these insecticides directly into rivers, which are waters covered 
by the Clean Water Act. Further, an airplane fitted with tanks and 
mechanical spraying apparatus is a “discrete conveyance.” Therefore 
all the elements of the definition of point source pollution are met.
154
 
Once the Ninth Circuit established that pesticide application was 
subject to NPDES permitting, citizen groups in other parts of the country 
sought to enforce the requirement. In No-Spray Coalition v. City of New 
York, a citizen group sued a municipality to challenge its program of 
spraying mosquito larvicides and adulticides into and over marshes and 
open water areas as part of municipal efforts to control mosquito-borne 
West Nile virus.
155
 The district court in No-Spray, like the district court 
 
151. Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent Irrigation Dist., 243 F.3d 526, 531 (9th Cir. 2001). 
152. Id. at 533 (citing Hudson River Fishermen’s Ass’n v. City of New York, 751 
F.Supp. 1088, 1101–02 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), aff’d, 940 F.2d 649 (2d Cir. 1991)). 
153. League of Wilderness Defenders v. Forsgren, 309 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 2008). 
154. Id. at 1185. 
155.  No-Spray Coal., Inc. v. City of New York, 351 F.3d 602 (2d Cir. 2003). 
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in Headwaters, dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint based on a perceived 
conflict with FIFRA; rather than focus on any substantive conflict 
between the statutes, the court simply held that the CWA citizen suit 
should not be available to enforce against CWA violations that were also 
technical violations of FIFRA. The court reasoned that the lack of a 
citizen suit provision in FIFRA precluded invocation of the CWA citizen 
suit for pesticide-related violations.
156
 
The Second Circuit, like the Ninth Circuit, reversed the district 
court’s dismissal.157 The court held that the lack of a citizen remedy 
under FIFRA does not affect the availability of a citizen enforcement 
remedy under the CWA, finding no reason “to eliminate from the CWA 
a remedy which it expressly provides, merely because another related 
statute does not similarly provide such a remedy.”158 The court refused to 
address the City’s alternative argument that regulation of pesticides 
under FIFRA precluded their regulation under the NPDES permitting 
program. Instead, it remanded to the district court for further proceedings 
to determine whether the City’s spraying program had committed a 
substantive violation of the CWA. On remand,
159
 the district court denied 
the pending cross motions for summary judgment, essentially siding with 
the plaintiffs on the contested legal issues of whether pesticides sprayed 
into the air directly over surface waters constituted “additions” to water, 
whether pesticides could be considered to be “pollutants,” and whether 
the spray vehicles and aircraft could be considered “point sources.” 
The combined effect of the legal holdings in the citizen enforcement 
initiatives in Headwaters, Forsgren, and No-Spray was, once again, to 
bring environmentally deleterious activities that had previously been 
exempted sub rosa through a policy of administrative nonenforcement 
within the regulatory ambit of the NPDES permitting program. However, 
unlike the administrative response in the case of gun clubs and 
landspreading of CAFO wastes, EPA refused to incorporate the citizen 
enforcement regulatory initiative for FIFRA into its agency regulatory 
program. Instead EPA sought, first through an interpretive statement,
160
 
and then through notice-and-comment rule making, to reverse the citizen 
enforcement/judicial expansion of the NPDES permitting program to 
cover pesticide application to waters. In November 2005, EPA adopted a 
 
156. Id.  
157. Id. 
158. Id. at 605. 
159. No-Spray Coal., Inc. v. City of New York, No. 00 Civ. 5395, 2005 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 11097 (S.D.N.Y. June 8, 2005). 
160. Notice and Request for Comment, 68 Fed. Reg. 48,385, 48,387–88 (Envtl. 
Prot. Agency Aug. 13, 2003). 
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final rule that amended 40 C.F.R. § 122.23 to provide an exemption from 
the NPDES permitting program for pesticide application: 
(h) The application of pesticides consistent with all relevant 
requirements under FIFRA (i.e., those relevant to protecting water 
quality), in the following two circumstances: 
(1) The application of pesticides directly to waters of the United 
States in order to control pests. Examples of such applications 
include applications to control mosquito larvae, aquatic weeds, or 
other pests that are present in waters of the United States. 
(2) The application of pesticides to control pests that are present over 
waters of the United States, including near such waters, where a 
portion of the pesticides will unavoidably be deposited to waters of 
the United States in order to target the pests effectively; for example, 
when insecticides are aerially applied to a forest canopy where waters 
of the United States may be present below the canopy or when 
pesticides are applied over or near water for control of adult 
mosquitoes or other pests.
161
 
However, the EPA Pesticide Rule was not the last word on the issue 
of NPDES coverage of pesticide application. Both environmental 
interests and agricultural interests challenged the final Pesticide Rule in 
National Cotton Council v. EPA.
162
 Environmental groups challenged the 
rule on the grounds that the Pesticide Rule illegally sought to exempt 
activities plainly covered by the statutory language of the CWA. Industry 
petitioners challenged the rule on the grounds that the rule did not go far 
enough, as it failed to exempt pesticide applications that violate pertinent 
FIFRA requirements as well as those that complied with FIFRA 
requirements. 
As in the citizen enforcement cases, the challenge to the EPA 
Pesticide Rule turned on the interpretation of the CWA terms “pollutant” 
and “point source.” Because EPA formulated its rule through notice-and-
comment rule making, the Sixth Circuit reviewed the challenge through 
the deferential lens of Chevron, examining first the question of whether 
EPA’s interpretation contravened Congress’s specific intent. EPA argued 
in defense of its rule that chemical pesticides are not pollutants as they 
are not “chemical wastes” included in CWA § 502(12), since, in EPA’s 
view, these pesticides were being used, not disposed of. EPA argued that 
since chemical pesticides fell outside the definition of waste, 
 
161. Application of Pesticides to Waters of the United States in Compliance with 
FIFRA, 71 Fed. Reg. 68,483, 68,485 (Nov. 27, 2006) (codified at 40 CFR § 122.3(h)(1)–
(2) (2012)).  
162. Nat’l Cotton Council of Am. v. EPA, 553 F.3d 927 (6th Cir. 2009).   
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nonchemical biological pesticides should likewise be excluded from the 
definition. The agency reasoned that it would be absurd to exempt 
chemical pesticides that are generally more hazardous from permitting 
while including more benign biological pesticides. Finally, EPA argued 
that although pesticide residues (including excess pesticides) might fall 
within the definition of chemical wastes, these residues were not 
discharged from a “point source” since they were not wastes at that time 
in the process. According to EPA, since the transformation from useful 
product to chemical waste takes place away from the point source, 
pesticide residues should be considered nonpoint source pollution, 
outside the scope of the NPDES permitting scheme.
163
 
The Sixth Circuit vacated the Pesticide Rule, finding no ambiguity 
in the definitions of “pollutant” or “addition from a point source” that 
would leave room for EPA interpretation. Under an ordinary 
understanding of the term “chemical wastes,” both excess pesticides and 
pesticide residues are waste materials, so the only pesticide applications 
that could be exempted were those aquatic pesticide applications that left 
no excess pesticides and no residues in the water.
 164
 The court similarly 
rejected EPA’s reasoning that excess pesticides and residues were not 
discharged “from” a point source, holding that there was no temporal 
element in the definition of a discharge so long as the point source was a 
but-for cause of the pesticide wastes in the water.
165
 Although the court 
relied on a plain meaning approach, the court noted the inconsistency 
between EPA’s position and the goals of the Act: “EPA’s interpretation 
ignores the directive given to it by Congress in the CWA, which is to 
protect water quality.”166 Interestingly, although the preamble to the EPA 
Pesticide Rule cites the successful citizen enforcement suits as part of the 
impetus for the rule, the Sixth Circuit does not cite these cases in 
explaining its “plain meaning” approach to the scope of the NPDES 
program. Ultimately, despite the availability of Chevron deference for an 
EPA rule making, the CWA interpretation established in the citizen 
enforcement initiatives—that pesticide application requires a NPDES 
permit—prevailed over the agency position. 
The Supreme Court denied review of Cotton Council.
167
 On October 
31, 2011, following a stay of the mandate in the Cotton Council case, 
EPA issued a nationwide general permit under the NPDES program for 
 
163. Id. at 934–35, 939. 
164. Id. at 936. 
165. Id. at 940. 
166. Id. at 939. 
167. Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n v. Baykeeper, 130 S. Ct. 1505 (2010). 
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the application of pesticides over and near water bodies.
168
 As in the case 
of gun clubs and CAFO manure landspreading, an activity within the 
letter and intent of the NPDES program was brought into the regulatory 
program by the initiation of citizen enforcement cases against a backdrop 
of agency nonenforcement.
169
 However, the regulatory political dynamic 
for pesticide regulation under the NPDES program is not yet complete: a 
bill passed the House of Representatives in the 112th Congress that 
would have exempted pesticide application from NPDES regulation.
170
 
D. Interbasin Water Transfers 
Various enterprises move water within and between watersheds. 
Huge quantities of water are moved for the purpose of irrigated 
agriculture, drinking water supplies, flood control, hydroelectric power 
generation, and even snowmaking in ski areas. Artificial water diversions 
pose unique challenges both environmentally and legally. Transfer of 
water contaminated with pollutants from runoff in agricultural, suburban, 
and urban areas introduces these contaminants to the receiving water 
body. High levels of nutrients in agricultural and suburban runoff 
promote algae blooms and eutrophication in receiving waters. Water 
 
168. EPA, PESTICIDE GENERAL PERMIT (PGP) FOR DISCHARGES FROM THE 
APPLICATION OF PESTICIDES (2011), available at http://www.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/
final_pgp.pdf. 
169. As this Article is being written, another, similar dynamic of citizen 
enforcement leading to an agency regulatory rollback is playing out before both EPA and 
the Supreme Court. In Northwest Environmental Defense Center v. Brown, 640 F.3d 
1063 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. granted sub nom. Decker v. Nw Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 22 
(2012), citizen plaintiffs argued successfully to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals that 
channeled stormwater runoff from logging roads required NPDES permits, and were not 
exempted by the regulatory exemption for silvicultural activities in 40 C.F.R. § 122.27 
(2012). The Supreme Court granted certiorari, and shortly after argument before the 
Supreme Court, EPA issued a final regulation purporting to clarify the exemption from 
NPDES permitting requirements for stormwater discharges from logging roads. 
Revisions to Stormwater Regulations to Clarify That an NPDES Permit Is Not Required 
for Stormwater Discharges from Logging Roads, 77 Fed. Reg. 72,970 (December 7, 
2012) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 122). The Supreme Court has permitted supplemental 
briefing on the effect of the regulations on its decision concerning the applicability of 
NPDES permitting requirements to logging road stormwater runoff. The Supreme Court 
ultimately upheld EPA’s interpretation of the preexisting regulation to exclude logging 
road runoff from regulation in Decker v. Northwest Environmental Defense Center, 133 
S.Ct. 1326 (2013). 
170. H.R. 872, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011) (proposing to restrict “the Administrator or a 
State” from requiring a NPDES permit for any “discharge from a point source into 
navigable waters of a pesticide authorized for sale, distribution, or use”). This bill has 
been reintroduced in the 113th Congress as H.R. 935. H.R. 935, 113th Cong. (2013). 
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supply transfers may introduce contaminants and heat from degraded 
watersheds to pristine watersheds. These may include contaminants that 
are naturally occurring in the donor watershed but impair the natural 
quality of receiving water bodies. Industrial effluents in the donor water 
body can contaminate otherwise pristine receiving waters. Water transfer 
impoundments may add heat to the transferred waters, and hydroelectric 
facilities can kill and grind up fish and other aquatic life. Transferred 
water may differ in color, turbidity, solids content, or clarity from the 
receiving water, causing visual and aesthetic impacts. Designated uses 
and water quality criteria in receiving water bodies may differ from those 
in the donor water body, so water that meets water quality standards 
where it is withdrawn may violate water quality standards where it is 
discharged.
171
 Finally, water transfers can introduce invasive species to 
the receiving water body. 
The status of water transfers under the NPDES permitting 
requirements of the CWA poses another problem of statutory 
interpretation in which a widely practiced activity falls within the literal 
statutory ambit of regulated point source discharges. There is no question 
that the contaminants transferred by water transfers are “pollutants”—
after all, the definition of “pollutant” specifically includes “biological 
materials” and “heat,” as well as “rock” and “sand” (the components of 
turbidity-inducing suspended solids). The CWA specifically identifies 
“suspended solids” as a “conventional pollutant” regulated according to 
Best Conventional Pollution Control Technology under the CWA.
172
 
Similarly, the typical infrastructure of water transfers easily fits the 
definition of a “point source,” which specifically includes a “channel,” 
“ditch,” or “tunnel.” Receiving waters are typically permanent surface 
water bodies that are navigable in fact, or tributary to waters that are 
navigable in fact, thus falling within the definition of “waters of the 
United States.” So any controversy concerning the application of the 
NPDES permitting requirement to water transfers turns on the 
interpretation of the “addition” element of the CWA permitting scheme. 
 
171. Section 303 of the Clean Water Act requires states to designate uses for each 
distinct segment of every navigable waterway within its borders. Clean Water Act of 
1972 § 303(c)–(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (c)–(d) (2012). Designated uses may range from 
simple suitability for fish propagation, to use for fishing and primary contact recreation 
(swimming), to use as a public potable water supply. Id. § 1313 (c)(2)(A). States must 
then promulgate numerical standards for various pollutants and pollutant properties that 
each body of water must meet in order to safely support its designated uses. Id. § 
1313(c)(2)(B). Thus, a water body that is designated as a public water supply will be 
assigned far more stringent water quality standards than another body of water in the 
same state that is designated only for fish propagation.  
172. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(a)(4) (2000). 
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Water transfers seem to fall literally within the common sense and 
dictionary definitions of the term “addition”—they clearly “add” to the 
receiving waters pollutants that were not already there. 
The legislative purpose sections of the CWA provide support for the 
inclusion of water transfers within the scope of NPDES permitting. On 
the one hand, the legislative purposes of the act specifically declare a 
national goal “to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and 
biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”173 The conference report 
explained the idea of water body “integrity” as a “concept that refers to a 
condition in which the natural structure and function of ecosystems is 
maintained . . . defined as that condition in existence before the activities 
of man invoked perturbations which prevented the system from returning 
to its original state of equilibrium.”174 This ecological integrity goal is 
clearly inconsistent with unregulated transfers of contaminated water 
from one water body to another. On the other hand, another section of 
the legislative purposes (added in 1977) declares that “it is the policy of 
Congress that the authority of each State to allocate quantities of water 
within its jurisdiction shall not be superseded, abrogated, or otherwise 
impaired by this chapter.”175 Senator Wallop, the sponsor of this 
amendment, made clear, however, that it was not intended to take 
precedence over “legitimate and necessary water quality 
considerations.”176 Thus, the legislative purposes seem to support the 
notion that water transfers should be considered in the NPDES 
permitting program so long as permitting is related to water quality 
issues and not water quantity regulation. 
Structurally, the CWA also supports inclusion of water transfers and 
even intrabasin discharges, at least under some circumstances. Section 
303 of the CWA, establishes a regime of water quality standards 
consisting of use designations and criteria for individual water body 
segments, and Sections 402(a) and 301(b)(1)(C) of the CWA 
contemplate the implementation and achievement of these segment-
based water quality standards through the NPDES permitting regime.
177
 
 
173. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2012). 
174. H.R. REP. NO. 92-911 (1972), reprinted in 1972 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra 
note 23.  
175. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g) (1987). 
176. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 179 n.67 (D.C. Cir. 1982); 123 
CONG. REC. 39,212 (1977) (statement of Sen. Wallop).  
177. Clean Water Act § 402(a) sets forth the basics of the NPDES permitting 
program, through which EPA or delegated state agencies may issue permits that allow 
facilities to discharge effluent with levels of pollutants at or below specified amounts and 
concentrations without violating the Act’s blanket prohibition on the discharge of 
pollutants from point sources into navigable waterways. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2012). 
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In addition, by including the Section 404 dredge-and-fill materials 
permitting requirement within the same triggering elements of the basic 
Section 301 prohibition of the CWA, Congress clearly contemplated that, 
at least in some cases, redeposit of materials already present in the very 
same “waters of the United States” would trigger the permitting 
requirement.
178
 
As with gun clubs, CAFO landspreading, and pesticides, citizen 
suits played a major role in the evolution of the application of NPDES 
permitting to water impoundments and transfers. Early on in the 
implementation of the CWA, in 1973, EPA issued a guidance document 
that discussed control of dam-induced water pollution as a nonpoint 
source pollution problem.
179
 Based on this guidance, EPA did not require 
dams to acquire NPDES permits, even though they might fall within the 
literal application of the terms “point source” and “addition of any 
pollutant.” In 1979, the National Wildlife Federation (“NWF”), joined by 
other environmental groups and the State of Missouri, sued EPA to 
challenge this policy and force EPA to require permits in National 
Wildlife Federation v. Gorsuch.
180
 EPA defended its policy of failing to 
require NPDES permits of dams on the grounds that pollutants “pass[] 
through the dam from one body of navigable water (the reservoir) into 
another (the downstream river),”181 and thus the “addition” element of 
the NPDES trigger was lacking. The D.C. Circuit ultimately rejected 
NWF’s challenge, relying heavily on the nascent agency deference 
 
Section 301(b)(1)(C) of the Act requires the application of more stringent effluent 
limitations in NPDES permits as necessary to ensure that the water quality standards of 
receiving bodies are met for all pollutants and pollutant properties. Id. § 1311. 
178.  Clean Water Act Section 301 (when read in tandem with the Section 502 
definitions section) prohibits the discharge of pollutants from point sources to waters of 
the United States “except as in compliance with” various other sections, including both 
the Section 402 (NPDES) permits and Section 404 (dredge and fill) permits. Compare 33 
U.S.C. § 1311, with id. § 1342. Thus, the same elements trigger the permitting 
requirement, which may be satisfied by either a Section 402 permit or a 404 permit 
depending on the circumstances. Courts have upheld the application of permitting 
requirements to the redeposit of dredged material into the same water from which it was 
removed. See United States v. M.C.C. of Fla., Inc., 863 F.2d 802 (11th Cir. 1989); 
Avoyelles Sportsmen’s League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1983); Am. Mining 
Cong. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 951 F. Supp. 267 (D.D.C 1997). But see United 
States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251 (4th Cir. 1997) (sidecasting not considered an “addition” 
of a pollutant). 
179. EPA, THE CONTROL OF POLLUTION FROM HYDROGRAPHIC MODIFICATIONS 68–
72 (1973). 
180. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156. Unlike the other citizen initiatives discussed in this 
Article, the NWF suit was brought against EPA to force EPA to regulate dams, not as an 
enforcement action against putative violators of the NPDES permitting requirement.  
181. Id. at 165. 
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principle to uphold EPA’s litigation position that releases of pollutants 
from dams did not constitute “additions” of pollutants subject to NPDES 
regulations.
182
 
Deference to EPA’s statutory interpretation embodied in its 
guidance was critical to the D.C. Circuit’s rejection of the citizen claims 
for NPDES regulation. The court anticipated the approach later adopted 
by the Supreme Court in Chevron in its statement of the role of the 
reviewing court: 
If we conclude that EPA’s interpretation is inconsistent with the 
language of the Clean Water Act, as interpreted in light of the 
legislative history, or if it “frustrates the policy that Congress sought 
to implement,” no amount of deference can save it. . . . But if the 
agency’s construction neither contradicts the language of the statute 
nor frustrates congressional policy, our inquiry is a limited one. The 
agency’s construction must be upheld if, in light of the appropriate 
degree of deference, it is “sufficiently reasonable,” even if it is not 
“the only reasonable one or even the reading the court would have 
reached” on its own.”
183
 
As noted, the Gorsuch case was not a case of direct citizen 
enforcement against an unpermitted discharger under the new citizen 
enforcement provisions; rather, citizens sought the more traditional route 
of seeking judicial review of an agency interpretation—a citizen remedy 
that had previously been available under the Administrative Procedure 
Act. This choice of the traditional remedy proved fatal to the legal 
position advanced by the citizen groups in Gorsuch—as deference to the 
agency interpretation proved to be an insurmountable obstacle to 
implementation of the NWF interpretation of the Act to include dams in 
the NPDES program. Ironically, the level of deference given by the D.C. 
Circuit to EPA’s dam policy would not apply under current Supreme 
Court precedent, as the Court held in Mead that agency guidance 
documents such as those involved in Gorsuch do not merit full Chevron-
style deference.
184
 
Once established in Gorsuch, judicial acceptance of EPA’s position 
on dams persisted even where NWF later sought to bring a citizen 
enforcement action in a similar case involving a pumped storage 
hydroelectric power facility. Pumped storage hydroelectric facilities store 
excess energy generated during periods of low-demand by using the 
electricity to pump water uphill into an impoundment, then releasing this 
water through generators to generate electricity during periods of higher 
 
182. Id. at 170–71. 
183. Id. at 171 (citations omitted). 
184. United States v. Mead, Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).  
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demand. In National Wildlife Federation v. Consumers Power,
185
 NWF 
sued an electric utility, alleging that its pumped storage facility 
discharged pollutants, in the form of the ground up remains of fish killed 
by the electric generating turbines, from a point source into the waters of 
Lake Michigan. The Sixth Circuit ultimately rejected NWF’s claims. The 
court agreed that the discharge was from a “point source” and that fish 
remains (and even fish) were clearly within the definition of “pollutants” 
covered by the NPDES program which specifically includes “biological 
materials.” Nevertheless, the court rejected NWF’s contention that the 
utility “added” these pollutants to waters. Relying heavily on Gorsuch 
and the newly minted Chevron deference, the court deferred to EPA’s 
interpretation and held that no “addition” of pollutants had occurred, as 
the pollutants had never been removed from “waters of the United 
States.”186 
Gorsuch and Consumers Power seemed to settle the question of the 
application of NPDES permitting to dams and impoundments, at least 
where the same contaminants passing through the dam end up 
downstream in the same water body. What about water transfers between 
watersheds, or from downstream to upstream where the contaminants 
would never naturally migrate? Such a circumstance formed the basis of 
a citizen suit in DuBois v. United States Department of Agriculture.
187
 In 
DuBois, a citizen and an environmental group challenged the United 
States Forest Service’s approval for the expansion of the Loon Mountain 
ski area located within USFS lands in New Hampshire. As part of the 
expansion, Loon Mountain proposed to increase pumping of water from 
the East Branch of the Pemigawassett River uphill to Loon Pond, a 
pristine mountain pond that the ski area used as a snowmaking reservoir. 
The citizen litigation was a hybrid case, seeking judicial review of the 
USFS approval as a violation of NEPA and accusing USFS of violating 
the CWA by discharging the polluted Pemigawassett water into Loon 
Pond without a NPDES permit.
188
 The ski resort intervened as a party 
 
185. NWF v. Consumers Power Co., 862 F.2d 580 (6th Cir. 1988). 
186. Id.  
187. Dubois v. USDA, 102 F.3d 1273 (1st Cir. 1996). 
188. There is some ambiguity in the reported decisions about whether the citizen 
plaintiffs relied on the Clean Water Act citizen enforcement provision, CWA § 505(a)(1). 
The opinions do not identify Section 505 as the basis of the cause of action, but the Court 
does apply the citizen suit notice requirement of Section 505(b)(1)(A), implying that the 
NPDES claims against the United States Forest Service and the intervenor defendant 
could be considered a citizen enforcement suit. The First Circuit suggested that the 
illegality of the proposed discharge under the CWA would be an independent ground to 
set aside the expansion approval even in the absence of jurisdiction under the CWA 
citizen enforcement suit provision. DuBois, 102 F.3d at 1301. 
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defendant. In defending the case, USFS expanded on EPA’s position in 
Gorsuch, arguing that the “waters of the United States” regulated by the 
CWA constituted a “singular entity,” such that pollutants that were 
already in any portion of the “waters of the United States” (such as 
Pemigewasset River) could not logically be “added” to another portion of 
the “waters of the United States” (such as Loon Pond). Although the 
district court dismissed the NPDES claim, the First Circuit Court of 
Appeals reinstated it, distinguishing Gorsuch and Consumers Power on 
the grounds that those cases involved single water bodies, not transfers 
between water bodies in a direction that water (and pollutants) would 
never naturally flow. The First Circuit accordingly held “that the 
Pemigewasset River and Loon Pond are two distinct ‘waters of the 
United States,’ and that the proposed transfer of water from one to the 
other constitutes an ‘addition.’ ”189 
The First Circuit’s “distinct waters” distinction was a crack in 
EPA’s dam, so to speak, against applying NPDES permitting to water 
transfers and impoundments. Two citizen suits challenging unpermitted 
water transfers followed, and leapfrogged their way through the judicial 
and administrative statutory interpretation process in a way that 
illustrates the complex interaction between citizen, judicial, and 
administrative interpretations of the statute. In the first case, brought in 
1998, Miccosukee Indian Tribe v. South Florida Water Management 
District, the Miccosukee tribe of Indians brought a citizen enforcement 
suit against a flood control district that pumped stormwater runoff 
contaminated with phosphorus and other nutrients from flood control 
canals into Lake Okeechobee, causing algae blooms and eutrophication 
problems in Lake Okeechobee as well as violating water quality 
standards for phosphorus.
190
 The fisheries and water resources of Lake 
Okeechobee that the citizen plaintiffs sought to protect are of vital 
importance to the Tribe. In the second case, commenced in 2000, Catskill 
Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited v. City of New York, several trout 
fishing-oriented environmental organizations brought a citizen 
enforcement action against the City of New York based on the City’s 
transfer of highly turbid water from a reservoir in one Catskill Mountain 
watershed through a tunnel that passed under a mountain and discharged 
into the Esopus Creek, a clear, fabled and beloved trout stream on the 
other side.
191
 This water transfer muddied the Esopus Creek, interfered 
with trout breeding, and made fly fishing the Esopus all but impossible 
 
189. Id. at 1299. 
190. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 721 So.2d 
389 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998). 
191. Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New York, 273 
F.3d 481, 484–85 (2d Cir. 2001). 
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due to limited visibility. The water transfer also caused violations of 
water quality standards in the Esopus Creek for turbidity and for 
temperature. 
In the Miccosukee case, the district court granted plaintiff’s motion 
for summary judgment, relying on DuBois to reject the “singular entity” 
theory and find that the transfer of polluted water from the flood control 
canal to Lake Okeechobee was indeed a pollutant “discharge” that 
triggered the NPDES permitting requirement. In the Catskill Mountains 
case, the district court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss, relying 
on Gorsuch and Consumers Power to hold that pollutants already in 
water could not be subject to permitting simply because the water was 
being transferred. The Catskill Mountains district court specifically 
relied on deference to EPA’s guidance reflected in the Gorsuch and 
Consumers Power decisions.
192
 
Both cases were appealed. In the Catskill Mountains appeal, the 
Second Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of the complaint.193 
It noted that the district court had inappropriately applied Chevron-style 
deference to EPA’s decades-old interpretive documents exempting dams 
from the NPDES program—a level of deference that was no longer 
appropriate in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Mead. It 
distinguished Consumers Power and Gorsuch, holding that those cases 
involved the movement of water within a single water body; while the 
Esopus Creek was a distinct water body from the Schoharie Reservoir. 
The Second Circuit used a “soup ladle” metaphor to explain the 
distinction: 
The Gorsuch and Consumers Power decisions comport with the plain 
meaning of “addition,” assuming that the water from which the 
discharges came is the same as that to which they go. If one takes a 
ladle of soup from a pot, lifts it above the pot, and pours it back into 
the pot, one has not “added” soup or anything else to the pot (beyond, 
perhaps, a de minimis quantity of airborne dust that fell into the 
ladle). In requiring a permit for such a “discharge,” the EPA might as 
easily require a permit for Niagara Falls. The present case, however, 
strains past the breaking point the assumption of “sameness” made by 
the Gorsuch and Consumers Power courts. Here, water is artificially 
diverted from its natural course and travels several miles from the 
Reservoir through Shandaken Tunnel to Esopus Creek, a body of 
water utterly unrelated in any relevant sense to the Schoharie 
Reservoir and its watershed. No one can reasonably argue that the 
water in the Reservoir and the Esopus are in any sense the “same,” 
such that “addition” of one to the other is a logical impossibility. 
 
192. Id. at 489–90. 
193. Catskill Mountains Chapter, 273 F.3d 481. 
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When the water and the suspended sediment therein passes from the 
Tunnel into the Creek, an “addition” of a “pollutant” from a “point 
source” has been made to a “navigable water,” and the terms of the 
statute are satisfied.
194
 
The Eleventh Circuit likewise upheld the citizen plaintiffs’ 
interpretation of the CWA permitting requirements in the Miccosukee 
appeal.
195
 Like the Second Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit found that 
pollutants were logically being “added” to Lake Okeechobee when they 
were introduced from another water body from which they would not 
naturally flow. Like the Second Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit rejected 
deference to EPA’s dam interpretation, finding it inapplicable to water 
transfers in any event. The court concluded: 
When a point source changes the natural flow of a body of water 
which contains pollutants and causes that water to flow into another 
distinct body of navigable water into which it would not have 
otherwise flowed, that point source is the cause-in-fact of the 
discharge of pollutants. And, because the pollutants would not have 
entered the second body of water but for the change in flow caused 
by the point source, an addition of pollutants from a point source 
occurs.
196
 
The court noted the consistency of this resolution with both the 
Second Circuit decision in Catskill Mountains, and the First Circuit 
decision in DuBois. 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the Miccosukee case, on 
the question whether a point source need be the origin of the pollutants 
discharged in order to invoke the permitting requirements of the NPDES 
program. The solicitor general, on behalf EPA, submitted a brief arguing 
the so-called “unitary waters” theory, a restatement of the “singular 
entity” theory rejected by the DuBois, Catskill Mountains, and 
Miccosukee courts. The Supreme Court
197
 declined to resolve the water 
transfers issue, limiting its holding to deciding that the flood 
management district could be subject to NPDES permitting even though 
the pollutants in question originated with various nonpoint sources for 
which the district was not responsible. The Court nevertheless vacated 
the decision of the Eleventh Circuit, holding that summary judgment for 
plaintiffs was inappropriate, and remanded the case for a trial on the 
question whether Lake Okeechobee was sufficiently distinct from the 
 
194. Id. at 492.  
195. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 280 F.3d 1364 
(11th Cir. 2002), vacated and remanded by, 541 U.S. 95 (2004). 
196. Id. at 1368–69. 
197. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004). 
116 Colo. Nat. Resources, Energy & Envtl. L. Rev. [Vol. 25:1 
storm water canal to constitute an “addition” of pollutants under the 
CWA, specifically citing the Second Circuit’s “soup ladle” analogy. 
The Court specifically declined to reject the “unitary waters” theory, 
and suggested that the Eleventh Circuit was free to consider the 
argument on remand. However, the fact that the Court remanded for a 
trial on the question whether the waters were meaningfully distinct as 
well as its dicta in discussing the unitary waters theory, seems to suggest 
the Supreme Court’s acceptance of the “different water bodies” 
distinction adopted by the First, Second, and Eleventh Circuits. In 
discussing the unitary waters theory and the United States’ reliance on 
Section 304(f) of the CWA, the Court noted: 
We note, however that § 1314(f)(2)(F) does not explicitly exempt 
nonpoint pollution sources from the NPDES program if they also fall 
within the “point source” definition. And several NPDES provisions 
might be read to suggest a view contrary to the unitary waters 
approach. For example, under the Act, a State may set individualized 
ambient water quality standards by taking into consideration “the 
designated uses of the navigable waters involved.” 33 U.S.C. § 
1313(c)(2)(A). Those water quality standards, in turn, directly affect 
local NPDES permits; if standard permit conditions fail to achieve 
the water quality goals for a given water body, the State must 
determine the total pollutant load that the water body can sustain and 
then allocate that load among the permit-holders who discharge to the 
water body. § 1313(d). This approach suggests that the Act protects 
individual water bodies as well as the “waters of the United States” as 
a whole.
198
 
The Supreme Court thus left undisturbed the holdings of the First, 
Second, and Eleventh Circuits requiring NPDES permits for water 
transfers. In response, EPA pressed its alliance with the water interests 
and sought to enshrine the very unitary waters approach the Supreme 
Court had declined to endorse in Miccosukee. First, in August, 2005, 
EPA issued an interpretive memorandum opining that Congress did not 
anticipate that water transfers were to be subject to NPDES permitting 
“based on the statute as a whole,” and based on EPA’s longstanding 
practice of not requiring permits for such transfers. EPA’s interpretive 
memorandum concluded, in essence, that the First, Second, and Eleventh 
Circuits had mistakenly interpreted the CWA.
199
 Based on this 
interpretive memorandum, defendants in the Catskill Mountains case 
argued to the Second Circuit in a post-trial appeal that that appellate 
 
198. Id. at 106–07. 
199. Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New York, 451 
F.3d 77, 82 (2d Cir. 2006).  
2014] Citizen Litigants Citizen Regulators 117 
court should reject its earlier interpretation of the CWA to require such 
permits. The Second Circuit rejected this gambit, noting that EPA’s 
interpretive memorandum contradicted the plain meaning of the CWA, 
was not entitled to deference as it was not subject to notice and comment 
rule making, and did not constitute the sort of change in the law that 
would permit one panel of the Second Circuit to ignore the stare decisis 
effect of a prior ruling by the Second Circuit.
200
 
Just days before the Second Circuit rejected application of EPA’s 
interpretive guidance, EPA issued a notice of proposed rule making that 
would enshrine its water transfers interpretation into a regulatory 
exemption in the NPDES permitting regulations.
201
 The Second Circuit 
declined to reconsider its decision on the basis of a proposed rule 
making,
202
 and the Supreme Court denied certiorari on the question.
203
 
On June 13, 2008, EPA issued the final Water Transfers Rule, 
adopting an explicit exemption from the NPDES permitting program for 
water transfers.
204
 Like the Pesticide Rule, the Water Transfers Rule 
added a provision to 40 C.F.R. § 122.3 that exempted these discharges 
from the NPDES permitting program: 
§ 122.3  Exclusions. 
The following discharges do not require NPDES permits: . . . 
(i) Discharges from a water transfer. Water transfer means an activity 
that conveys or connects waters of the United States without 
subjecting the transferred water to intervening industrial, municipal, 
or commercial use. This exclusion does not apply to pollutants 
introduced by the water transfer activity itself to the water being 
transferred.
205
 
As with EPA’s pesticide rule, the Water Transfers Rule sought to 
reverse a series of Court of Appeals decisions in citizen suits that had 
interpreted the NPDES permit program expansively in favor of 
environmental protection. The preamble to the final rule explicitly relied 
on the holding in Brand X, that an agency interpretation contrary to prior 
judicial interpretation was nonetheless entitled to Chevron-style 
 
200. Id. at 83 n.5. 
201. NPDES Water Transfers Proposed Rule, 71 Fed. Reg. 32,887 (June 7, 2006). 
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deference.
206
 The court rejected the Second Circuit’s reasoning that 
pollutants are added whenever they come from a source outside the 
particular receiving water body, “[r]ather, EPA believes that an addition 
of a pollutant under the [CWA] occurs when pollutants are introduced 
from outside the waters being transferred.”207 EPA also claimed to 
interpret the term “addition” restrictively based on its reading of the 
overall statutory structure of the CWA, particularly its balance between 
federally mandated control of point sources of pollutants and state 
control over issues of water allocation and quantity. 
The Water Transfers Rule was immediately tested in another South 
Florida Water Management District storm water pumping case, Friends 
of the Everglades v. South Florida Water Management District.
208
 The 
district court in Friends of the Everglades held, after a trial, that the 
pump stations were transferring pollutants to a distinct water body, and 
required the Water Management District to obtain a permit. The final 
Water Transfers Rule was issued during the pendency of the appeal from 
this ruling, and the case became a test of the validity of the Water 
Transfers Rule. The Eleventh Circuit upheld the Water Transfers Rule,
209
 
finding ambiguity in the CWA term “any addition of any pollutant” 
despite its earlier holding that the term embraced water transfers. The 
court countered the Second Circuit’s soup ladle analogy with a bucket 
analogy: 
Consider the issue this way: Two buckets sit side by side, one with 
four marbles in it and the other with none. There is a rule prohibiting 
“any addition of any marbles to buckets by any person.” A person 
comes along, picks up two marbles from the first bucket, and drops 
them into the second bucket. Has the marble-mover “add[ed] any 
marbles to buckets”? On one hand, as the Friends of the Everglades 
might argue, there are now two marbles in a bucket where there were 
none before, so an addition of marbles has occurred. On the other 
hand, as the Water District might argue and as the EPA would decide, 
there were four marbles in buckets before, and there are still four 
marbles in buckets, so no addition of marbles has occurred. Whatever 
 
206. NPDES Water Transfers Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. at 33,700  (“Courts are required to 
accept an agency’s reasonable interpretation of a statute, even if this interpretation differs 
from what the court believes is the ‘best’ statutory interpretation” (citing Nat’l Cable & 
Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X, 545 U.S. 967, 980 (2005)). 
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nom. Friends of the Everglades v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 F.3d 1210 (11th Cir. 
2009). 
209. Friends of the Everglades, 570 F.3d at 1228. 
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position we might take if we had to pick one side or the other of the 
issue, we cannot say that either side is unreasonable.
210
 
Finding ambiguity and finding EPA’s interpretation to be 
“permissible,” the court proceeded to uphold the Water Transfers Rule 
under Chevron step two.
211
 
Although the Supreme Court denied certiorari in the Friends of the 
Everglades case, the final verse of the water transfers saga has not quite 
been written. Several petitions challenging the Water Transfer Rule were 
filed, some in district courts and some in Circuit Courts. The Circuit 
Court challenges were all consolidated and transferred to the Eleventh 
Circuit by lottery pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2210. Because the Water 
Transfers Rule does not fall within any of the categories for which direct 
Circuit Court review is provided by the CWA Section 509(b)(1), the 
petitioners moved to dismiss the Eleventh Circuit challenges for lack of 
jurisdiction, in favor of proceeding in the district court cases. On October 
26, 2012, the Eleventh Circuit dismissed the pending rule challenge 
petitions on the grounds that it lacked jurisdiction to hear them under 
Section 509 of the CWA.
212
 Rule challenge plaintiffs are thus free to 
pursue their challenge to the Water Transfers Rule in district court 
pursuant to Administrative Procedure Act Section 706, and their 
challenge is pending in the Southern District of New York.
213
 
Citizen suits thus drove the development of the law governing the 
application of NPDES permitting requirements to water transfers. As in 
the case of gun clubs, CAFO manure landspreading, and pesticide 
application, citizen enforcement in a field of pollutant discharges 
abandoned by EPA met with initial success in the courts, thereby 
expanding the remedial scope of the CWA. Unlike EPA’s reaction in the 
case of gun clubs and landspreading, EPA chose to resist the citizen 
plaintiffs’ success in expanding the CWA’s environmental protection 
like it did in reaction to citizen success on regulation of pesticide 
discharges. 
 
210. Id. 
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V. ASSESSMENT OF CITIZEN SUIT IMPACT ON THE 
CLEAN WATER ACT REGULATORY PROGRAM 
These four case studies illustrate the profound impact that citizen 
enforcement provisions have had on the CWA regulatory program. In 
three of the four cases, at least, the availability of the citizen enforcement 
suit has brought environmentally harmful activities into the scope of the 
NPDES regulatory program, with its strict technology- and water quality-
based limits on water pollution. In two of the four cases (gun clubs and 
CAFO manure landspreading), a reluctant EPA accommodated the 
citizen regulatory initiatives into its own regulatory program. In the other 
two cases, EPA unsuccessfully resisted the regulatory expansion sought 
by the citizens regarding pesticides, while its resistance to citizen 
expansion of the NPDES permitting regarding interbasin water transfers 
is still undergoing judicial review. What conclusions can be drawn from 
this forty-year experience with citizen-regulators taking enforcement 
matters into their own hands? For one, the availability of the citizen 
enforcement suit has, by disrupting the bilateral regulatory model, 
resulted in fuller implementation of the CWA’s goals to restore and 
protect the integrity of the nation’s waters. Also, the citizen enforcement 
tool has given citizens a role in setting the regulatory agenda, by forcing 
EPA to take regulatory action on matters it would otherwise have 
ignored (or addressed without engaging in rule making.). Finally, even 
where the citizen regulatory initiatives are ultimately unsuccessful, they 
have forced EPA and congressional actors to expend political capital 
where these political actors have supported regulations or statutory 
amendments seeking to roll back citizens’ hard-won victories in court. 
A. Disruption of the Bilateral Model Leading to Expanded Water 
Protection 
In each of these four cases studies, citizens sought enforcement of 
CWA permitting requirements against activities that were within the 
literal prohibition of the CWA Section 301, but which were effectively 
exempted from regulation by a pattern of EPA and state nonenforcement. 
EPA’s nonenforcement practices against gun clubs, CAFOs, pesticide 
applications, and water transfers can be seen as a direct result of agency 
capture by regulated entities under a bilateral regulatory model in which 
the regulatory program is a result of political bargaining between the 
regulatory agency and the regulated entities. It is no accident that these 
four instances of agency underenforcement involve actors with strong 
lobbies and favored political status. 
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The availability of a citizen enforcement remedy that is outside the 
bi-lateral regulatory model and immune to political influence thus 
brought these four activities, which are clearly within the ambit and 
statutory purpose of CWA regulation, within the regulatory program. 
Inclusion of these activities in the NPDES program can only help 
furthering the statutory goal of restoring and protecting the chemical, 
ecological, and biological integrity of the nation’s waters. The citizen 
enforcement suit has performed exactly as intended in this way—
fostering more-complete achievement of congressional goals and 
insuring, in the immortal words of Judge Wright, that “important 
legislative purposes, heralded in the halls of Congress, are not lost or 
misdirected in the vast hallways of the federal bureaucracy.”214 
B. Driving the Agenda 
If the successful litigations in each of these citizen initiatives were 
the last word on the subject of regulating gun clubs, CAFOs, pesticide 
applications, and water transfers, then the citizen suit could be declared 
an unalloyed success for the achievement of the 1972 Congress’s lofty 
clean water goals. But in fact, each of these cases served as a springboard 
for further regulatory and/or congressional action either to implement (in 
the case of gun clubs and CAFOs) or to thwart the citizen victories (in 
the case of pesticides and water transfers). 
The regulatory and potential congressional responses to these 
citizen initiatives may cast some doubt on the ultimate success of citizen 
enforcement action in achieving clean water goals. After all, in the cases 
of pesticide application and water transfers, the citizen suit successes 
may yet be undone by some combination of rule making and 
congressional response. EPA has limited resources, and the result of the 
citizen pesticides enforcement initiatives was to prompt EPA to expend 
its regulatory resources first to engage in a rule making to adopt its 
pesticides exemption, and then to expend resources to issue a general 
permit for pesticide application after the Pesticides Rule was struck down 
by the Sixth Circuit. Resources EPA spent responding to citizen 
initiatives might otherwise have been spent on better implementation of 
other parts of the CWA regulatory program. 
Despite this diversion of regulatory resources, the citizen 
enforcement initiatives in these cases at least had the benefit of forcing 
EPA to engage in a public, adversarial rule-making process that it would 
have foregone under the pure bilateral regulatory model. In this way, 
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citizen suits were a much more effective way to force EPA regulatory 
action on the subjects of CAFO land spreading, pesticide applications, 
and water transfers than petitions for rule making, addressed to agency 
discretion, ever would have been in the absence of the citizen 
enforcement remedy. In the case of CAFO land spreading, pesticide 
applications, and water transfers, the citizen enforcement initiatives 
prompted rule making on issues EPA might have preferred to ignore. 
Three of the four of these citizen enforcement initiatives were at least 
successful in prompting agency rule making, a much better record of 
success than equivalent citizen petitions for agency rule making.
215
 
 
215. No cases could be located in which a citizen suit successfully forced EPA to 
promulgate or amend regulations in the absence of a binding statutory deadline. 
However, NGO citizen suits against nongovernmental organizations have spurred more 
modest agency actions in a limited number of cases. For example, in 2008, EPA 
granted part of a petition from the Bluewater Network requesting a comprehensive 
assessment of the water quality impacts of various wastes from cruise ships. See Letter 
from Benjamin H. Grumbles, Assistant Administrator, EPA, to Russell Long, Program 
Advisor, and Teri Shore, Clean Vessels Campaign Director, Bluewater Network (Jan. 31, 
2008), available at http://water.epa.gov/polwaste/vwd/upload/2008_03_03_oceans_
cruise_ships_Bluewater_Network_Petition_Response_20_31_08.pdf. This led to the 
publication by EPA of a Cruise Ship Discharge Assessment Report in the Federal 
Register, but no associated regulatory action has yet been taken in direct response to the 
Bluewater Network’s petition. See Draft Cruise Ship Discharge Assessment Report, 72 
Fed. Reg. 72,353 (Dec. 20, 2007). Additionally, in 2009, EPA responded favorably to a 
petition from the Center on Biological Diversity (“CBD”) requesting that EPA “publish 
revised water quality criteria and information taking into account new scientific 
information about ocean acidification” and “publish information pursuant to 
[S]ection 304(a)(2) providing guidance on ocean acidification to provide much needed 
information to the states and serve as the basis for a comprehensive and uniform 
approach to ocean acidification.” EPA’s response does not specifically grant or deny the 
petition, but states that a Notice of Data Availability and a guidance document would be 
released in response to the petition, and that public comments were being requested 
concerning the potential promulgation of ocean acidification criteria. This response 
seems to have been negotiated between EPA and CBD, as the last paragraph reads: “We 
understand, based on our discussions with CBD, that these actions will address 
the concerns outlined in the two submissions identified above and that no further 
response is necessary. EPA would like CBD to commit to refrain from a lawsuit now and 
then agree to withdraw its petition and Notice of Intent effective on the release date of the 
NODA in the Federal Register.” See Letter from Benjamin H. Grumbles, Assistant 
Administrator, EPA, to Miyoko Sakashita, Attorney, CBD (Jan. 16, 2009), available at 
http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/campaigns/ocean_acidification/pdfs/EPA_Response_t
o_CBD_Ocean_Acidification_Petition.pdf.   
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C. Effect on Judicial Review 
 As the pesticide and water transfers examples illustrate, EPA’s 
regulatory efforts to roll back citizen enforcement victories have to date 
had mixed success. The Pesticide Rule was struck down by the Sixth 
Circuit, while the Water Transfers Rule has been endorsed by the 
Eleventh Circuit (even though the actual petition for review of the rule 
remains pending in district court within the Second Circuit). In both 
cases reviewing EPA responses to citizen enforcement successes, the 
courts, following Brand X, purported to apply the same deferential 
standard of review under Chevron, despite the existence of prior judicial 
decisions contrary to EPA interpretation. It is thus impossible to draw 
any firm conclusions about the effect that citizen enforcement initiatives 
have on ultimate judicial deference to a subsequent agency interpretation. 
Nevertheless, the existence of prior judicial decisions holding the 
activities in question to be within the scope of the NPDES program 
cannot help but form a backdrop favorable to the citizens’ interpretation. 
At a minimum, the existence of successful citizen prosecutions negates 
the possibility of the court relying on a tradition of nonregulation of an 
activity as grounds for concluding the activity was never within the 
scope of the NPDES program.
216
 Prior judicial interpretations also form a 
persuasive counterpoint to EPA for a court seeking to determine whether 
Congress had a specific intent to cover a particular activity in the NPDES 
permitting program.
217
 
D. Agency and Congressional Political Capital 
As these case histories demonstrate, the implementation of a 
complex statutory regulatory program like the CWA is not a simple 
matter of Congress enacting a law and EPA enforcing it. Rather, 
statutory implementation is a complex, pluralistic process involving a 
continuing interaction between Congress, citizens, regulated entities, the 
agency, and the courts. One might ask whether the citizen enforcement 
suits did much to advance the CWA regulatory agenda, when two of the 
four citizen litigation victories were the subject of EPA regulatory 
negation and possible congressional negation as well. 
 
216. Compare with Am. Mining Cong. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 951 F.Supp. 
267 (D.D.C. 1997), where the court relied on congressional acquiescence in a pattern of 
nonenforcement by EPA and Corps of Engineers to conclude that Clean Water Act 
permitting requirements did not apply to incidental fallback from dredging activities in 
wetlands. 
217. See Nat’l Cotton Council of Am. v. EPA, 533 F.3d 927 (6th Cir. 2009). 
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Nonetheless, even unsuccessful citizen regulatory initiatives may 
advance environmental protection. When the agency with 
“environmental protection” in its name initiates rule making to reduce 
water quality protection, as EPA did with both the pesticides rule and the 
Water Transfers Rule, it does so at the expense of its political capital and 
credibility with organized environmental interests. While these interests 
may not be as politically powerful as the agricultural lobby, they carry 
some weight in the pluralistic administrative and political process that 
the CWA’s structure helps to establish. Likewise, when congressional 
representatives or a particular political party becomes associated with 
efforts to roll back environmental protections won in the courts, they do 
so at some political cost. In the absence of the citizen enforcement suit, 
the same environmentally unproductive result would have been achieved 
through a silent policy of agency nonenforcement, without these political 
costs. Citizen enforcement may or may not ultimately be successfully in 
requiring NPDES permits for pesticide applications and water transfers, 
but it has certainly been successful in forcing EPA to show its true colors 
when agricultural and municipal interests seek to evade environmental 
regulation. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The citizen enforcement suit provision of the CWA has proven to be 
the ultimate upset of the traditional bilateral regulatory state. By 
providing citizens with a direct enforcement remedy, Congress not only 
provided for full enforcement of the CWA’s remedial provisions, but it 
also deprived the regulatory agency of its most potent interpretive tool—
interpretation by unreviewable nonenforcement. At the same time it 
provided citizens with a tool to drive the regulatory agenda, forcing 
agency attention on regulating otherwise politically-favored groups. This 
profound disruption to the former bilateral model of the regulatory state 
is illustrated by four citizen enforcement initiatives that drove EPA’s 
regulatory agenda—gun club discharges, pesticide discharges, 
landspreading of CAFO manure, and water transfers. In each case, 
citizen enforcement forced EPA to react to judicial developments in the 
scope of the CWA regulatory program. While EPA’s reaction has varied 
from incorporating the environmental initiatives into its own regulatory 
program (as with landspreading of manure) to fiercely resisting the 
citizen innovations (as in the case of pesticide applications and water 
transfers), citizen enforcement has had a profound effect on 
implementation and interpretation of the CWA regulatory program in 
each case. 
